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Abstract 
 
 
We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms, and 
that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is 
that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by 
low quality firms, so the debt issuance of low quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting 
bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of 
credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to 
investigate the forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns. 
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In most modern accounts of the credit cycle, fluctuations in the quantity of credit are driven 
by time-varying financing frictions, due to changes in borrowers’ net worth or in bank capital 
(Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); and 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)). Notably absent from these accounts is the possibility that time-
varying investor beliefs or tastes play a role in determining the quantity and allocation of credit. This 
absence is surprising given abundant evidence of historical periods – such as the 1980s junk bond era 
or the credit boom of 2004-2007 – when credit markets appear to have become overheated, 
potentially reflecting heightened investor risk appetites or over-optimism.
1  During these periods, 
investors granted credit at low promised yields to borrowers of poor quality, and experienced low 
returns when these borrowers later defaulted and credit spreads widened. In this paper we draw on 
more than 80 years of historical data to show that this pattern – deteriorating issuer quality followed 
by low investor returns – should be understood as a recurring feature of the credit cycle. 
Our approach is to link patterns of corporate debt financing to time-series variation in the 
pricing of credit risk. The key insight is that broad changes in the pricing of credit risk 
disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low credit quality firms. To the extent that 
firms issue more debt when credit is “cheap,” the debt issuance of low credit quality firms may then 
be a particularly useful barometer of financing conditions. Specifically, time-variation in debt issuer 
quality may be useful for forecasting excess corporate bond returns: risky corporate bonds should 
underperform default-free government bonds following periods when corporate debt issuers are of 
particularly poor credit quality. To be clear, we are not claiming that issuer quality causes low future 
bond returns; issuer quality may forecast corporate bond returns because firms respond to time-
variation in the cost of capital.  
To test this hypothesis, we form time-series measures of debt issuer quality. Our primary 
                                                            
1 See Kaplan and Stein (1993) and Grant (1992) on the 1980s LBO and junk bond boom, Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 
(2009) on the 2000s structured finance boom, Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2010), Ivashina and Sun 
(2010) and Shivdasani and Wang (2009) on the 2000s leveraged loan and LBO boom, and Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2011) on the deterioration of mortgage loans prior to the subprime crisis.  
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measure compares the average credit quality of firms with high debt issuance – proxied using each 
firm’s expected default frequency – to the credit quality of firms with low debt issuance. A second 
measure is constructed from credit ratings: each year from 1926 to 2008, we compute the fraction of 
corporate bond issuance that is rated speculative grade. Building on Hickman (1958), Atkinson 
(1967), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), we show that variation in issuer quality is a 
central feature of the credit cycle: when aggregate credit increases, the average quality of issuers 
deteriorates. 
We use these measures of issuer quality to forecast the excess returns on corporate bonds. 
Following periods when issuer quality is poor, corporate bonds significantly underperform Treasury 
bonds of similar maturities. The degree of return predictability is large in both economic and 
statistical terms. The predictability is most striking for high yield bonds – with univariate R
2 statistics 
up to 30% at a 3-year horizon – but similar results obtain for investment grade bonds, albeit with 
diminished magnitude. Issuer quality has incremental forecasting power for corporate bond returns 
over and above other macros variables that researchers have used to forecast corporate bond returns, 
including credit spreads and the term spread. Our results also obtain when we control for the Fama 
and French (1993) stock market factors (contemporaneous with the bond returns)—suggesting that 
we are capturing alpha in our forecasting regressions. Furthermore, the quality of debt issuance is a 
better forecaster of excess corporate bond returns than the aggregate quantity of debt issuance.  
In summary, our results demonstrate a high degree of predictability in corporate bond returns 
that is linked to the composition of corporate debt financing. Flipping this relationship around, 
expected bond returns appear to be an important driver of the mix of firms that are borrowing at any 
point in time, so the results may be of independent interest from a corporate finance standpoint. For 
instance, our results are related to Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2011) who document that the 
capital raised by high yield firms is pro-cyclical. The forecasting results imply significant time-
variation in the real cost of debt financing for firms: a one-standard deviation deterioration in issuer  
3 
 
quality is associated with a reduction in the cost of credit for high-yield firms of roughly 1.66 
percentage points per annum.  
We then use these findings to explore the forces that drive time-series variation in expected 
corporate bond excess returns. We consider three potential sources of return predictability: (1) 
countercyclical variation in the rationally determined price of risk as would arise in consumption-
based asset pricing models; (2) time-variation in effective risk tolerance due to financial 
intermediary-related frictions; and (3) time-varying mispricing due to investor biases in evaluating 
credit risk over the cycle. In attempting to discriminate between these sources, we recognize that it is 
impossible to fully rule out one explanation or another. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe 
that just one channel is operational. 
We first consider whether the results are consistent with consumption-based models in which 
markets are integrated and the rationally determined price of risk varies in a countercyclical fashion. 
For instance, investors’ risk aversion may vary due to habit formation as in Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999). According to explanations of this type, investors are not systematically surprised when the 
bonds of low quality firms who often receive funding during booms later underperform. 
Several of our main findings are consistent with consumption-based asset pricing models. 
Specifically, issuer quality has a clear business cycle component. Furthermore, when included as 
controls in our return forecasting regressions, macroeconomic variables slightly attenuate the effects 
of issuer quality. However, several of our findings are more difficult to square with consumption-
based models. For instance, we forecast statistically significant negative excess returns in a number 
of sample years. Because credit assets typically underperform Treasuries during bad economic times, 
consumption-based models would always predict positive expected excess returns. Furthermore, our 
issuer quality measures are disconnected from traditional forecasters of the equity premium, and do 
not forecast excess stock returns, cutting against the idea that issuer quality simply proxies for a 
rationally time-varying price of risk in fully integrated stock and bond markets.  
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Another source of variation in expected returns could stem from changes in intermediary risk 
tolerance. For example, a number of authors have argued that fluctuations in intermediary equity 
capital may drive changes in risk premia. We examine a number of proxies for intermediary balance 
sheet strength, including lagged intermediary capital ratios and balance sheet growth. Several of these 
measures are correlated with issuer quality in the expected direction (e.g., issuer quality tends to be 
poor when insurers, which are large holders of corporate bonds, have high equity capital ratios). 
However, the forecasting power of issuer quality is not impacted by the addition of intermediary-
related controls. 
A slightly different intermediary-based explanation is suggested by Rajan (2005), who argues 
that agency problems may encourage some institutions to “reach for yield,” buying riskier assets with 
high promised yields when riskless interest rates are low. Consistent with this idea, we show that 
issuer quality declines when yields on Treasury bonds are low or have recently fallen. On the other 
hand, interest rate controls do little to affect the forecasting power of issuer quality in our return 
forecasting regressions. 
A third source of variation in expected returns could stem from biased investor beliefs. 
Specifically, investors may make biased assessments of default probabilities, leading to time-varying 
mispricing of credit. One natural bias might stem from over-extrapolation of past default rates or 
bond returns. For example, following a string of years in which few firms default, investors may 
underestimate future default probabilities, leading them to bid up the prices of risky corporate bonds. 
As a result, investors are surprised by periods of elevated corporate defaults, resulting in sharp 
declines in corporate bond prices. 
Explanations that appeal investor over-extrapolation allow for negative expected excess 
returns, consistent with our findings.
2 And, while it is difficult to measure investors’ beliefs directly, 
                                                            
2 Of course, investors themselves would always expect positive excess returns, even if they have a tendency to over-
extrapolate past outcomes. However, the best econometric forecast of excess returns in such a world could be 
significantly negative on occasion.  
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the extrapolation story predicts that issuer quality should decline following periods of low defaults or 
high credit returns. This pattern emerges quite strongly in the data, suggesting that the recent 
experience of credit market investors may play a role in shaping investors’ expectations or tastes.  
In summary, we cannot fully pin down the forces that drive variation in expected returns. 
While consumption-based explanations are surely an important part of the overall story, several 
pieces of evidence suggest that they may not be the full story. Specifically, the evidence hints that the 
second and third channels – intermediary risk tolerance and mistaken investor beliefs – might play 
some role. If we adopt this interpretation, then erosion in issuer quality may be a useful signal of 
credit market overheating. 
Our findings build on three strands of research. First, there is prior work in finance linking 
time-varying financing patterns to expected returns (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2000)). Related to this, 
a recent line of enquiry uses government debt growth to forecast financial crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008)). Second, a large literature in macroeconomics, starting with Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) attempts to understand fluctuations in the quantity of credit as a driver of the business cycle. 
Third, researchers in both macroeconomics and finance have used credit spreads and other interest 
rates to forecast changes in real activity (Fama (1981), Thoma and Gray (1998), Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek (2011)).  
I.  Empirical Design 
Here we develop a reduced-form model to motivate the empirical design. In the model, debt 
issuance responds to changes in the pricing of credit. The model explains why debt issuer quality may 
be useful for forecasting excess credit returns. The model also pinpoints the circumstances under 
which quality may be more useful than aggregate quantities for forecasting excess credit returns, and 
under what circumstances quality may contain information about expected returns beyond what is 
revealed by credit spreads. 
A.  A reduced-form model of credit spreads and debt issuance  
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Assume that credit spreads (the difference between corporate bond yields and risk-free yields 
of the same maturity) are equal to expected credit losses plus expected excess returns. At this point 
we can be agnostic about what drives variation in expected returns: it might be a rationally time-
varying credit risk premium, time-varying mispricing, or both. As a simple reduced form, we write 
the credit spread st for firms of type θ as 
, t tt s   
 
(1) 
whereθ,t is the time-varying probability of default, δt denotes the time-varying expected return on 
credit assets, and βθ is the exposure of type θ firms to the market-wide pricing credit risk. Thus, the 
expected excess return on bonds of type θ is 
,1 [] . tt t E rx    
 
(2) 
For simplicity, we assume that θt does not directly affect expected excess returns. Since default 
probabilities θt vary over time, equations (1) and (2) capture the idea that spreads mean different 
things at different times: spreads can be low because default probabilities are low or because 
expected excess returns are low. 
For simplicity, suppose firms are either low default risk L or high default risk H, with   
Lt < Ht for all t. Our central assumption is that L < H. This means that the bonds of high default 
risk firms are more heavily exposed to market-wide changes in the pricing of credit risk. 
Firms of type θ choose their debt issuance dt (or leverage) by trading off the benefits of 
issuing additional cheap debt against the costs of deviating from their target capital structure, as in 
Stein (1996). Target capital structure has two independent components: a part t that is common to all 
firms and a part t that is specific to firms of type θ. A variety of factors unrelated to expected 
returns may cause target leverage to fluctuate, such as changes in investment opportunities. We 
assume that firms choose their issuance to solve  
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(3) 
where  reflects the cost of deviating from target leverage. The optimal choice of dθt is given by 
* (/ ), tt t t d       
 
(4) 
so firms borrow more when the expected returns on credit assets are low.  A neo-classical 
interpretation of equation (4) appeals to standard Q-theory logic: the optimal scale of corporate 
investment, and hence debt issuance, rises when rationally required returns decline. A more 
behavioral interpretation of (4) might emphasize corporate market-timing behavior.
3 However, our 
empirical design does not hinge on the specific interpretation one adopts. 
The logic of our identification strategy can be seen immediately from equation (4). Debt 
issuance is driven by changes in expected returns and by changes in target leverage. Since  LH    , 
fluctuations in expected returns t have a larger impact on the issuance of high default risk firms than 
on the issuance of low default risk firms. Changes in target leverage are not informative about 
expected returns and have a common component that is shared by all firms. Thus, it is useful to 
examine the difference in debt issuance between high- and low-default risk firms. 
Now, suppose that half of the firms are low default risk and the other half are high default 
risk, then equation (4) implies that the total quantity of debt issuance is 
** (2 ) (( )/ ) . HtL t tH tL t HL t dd         
 
(5) 
A proxy for the issuer quality mix is the difference in debt issuance between high and low default risk 
firms 
                                                            
3 The idea that firms can back out the component of credit spreads that is due to any time-varying mispricing may seem 
objectionable: it seems implausible that firms could have an informational advantage over sophisticated investors in 
forecasting broad changes in spreads. However, as emphasized by Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), firms may have 
an institutional advantage in exploiting aggregate mispricing even if they have no informational advantage. Sophisticated 
investors are often subject to limits of arbitrage which may be particularly relevant in the case of market-wide mispricing. 
By contrast, operating firms can exploit this kind of mispricing by adjusting their capital structures without the fear of 
performance-based withdrawals.  
8 
 
** () ( () / ) . HtL t H tL t HL t dd         
 
(6) 
By looking at the quality of issuance, we remove the impact of the common factor t which affects 
the issuance of all firms. Thus, the quality mix helps isolate the information that issuance contains 
about expected returns. 
B.  Forecasting returns using issuance quantity and quality 
Under these assumptions, both quantity (
**
HtL t dd  )  and quality  (
**
HtL t dd  ) will negatively 
forecast excess returns in a univariate regression. In a bivariate forecasting regression that includes 
both quantity and quality, the coefficients on both variables will be negative so long as 
2 0    . 
However, quality becomes more informative than quantity as 
2
 
 
grows large (the Internet Appendix 
contains the relevant calculations.
4) Intuitively, examining the quality mix should be particularly 
informative if aggregate debt issuance has an important common time-series component that is 
unrelated to future returns. For example, if aggregate debt issuance fluctuates significantly due to 
shocks to aggregate investment opportunities, then the quality mix of issuance may be a better 
predictor of returns than the total quantity of issuance. The model also suggests that the results will 
be strongest when forecasting the returns of low-grade bonds which have the greatest exposure to 
market-wide changes in the pricing of credit.  
C.  Forecasting returns using spreads and issuance quality 
Credit spreads positively forecast excess returns on corporate bonds. Should issuer quality 
have incremental forecasting power for returns beyond spreads? In a multivariate forecasting 
regression of excess returns on credit spreads and issuer quality, the coefficient on spreads is positive 
and the coefficient on 
**
HtL t dd    is negative. This is because both spreads and issuer quality are 
affected by factors other than expected returns. For instance, as the time-series volatility of default 
                                                            
4 An Internet Appendix, which includes all supplementary unreported results, is posted on the authors’ websites.  
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probabilities (i.e., fundamentals) grows large, spreads become less informative about δt.
5 
D.  Measuring issuer quality empirically 
How should we measure issuer quality in the data? A first approach which follows directly 
from equation (6) is to classify firms as either high or low default risks and then compare the debt 
issuance of these two groups, i.e., 
**
HtL t dd  . A related idea is to compute the share of debt issuance 
accounted for by high default risk firms, i.e., 
** * /( ) HtH t L t ddd  . It may also be useful to construct 
measures which reflect the continuous nature of firm default risk. Thus, a third measure compares the 
default risk of high debt issuers with that of low debt issuers each period 
** [| ] [| ] , tt i i t t i i t ISS E High d E Low d  
 
(7) 
where we now allow quality βi and debt issuance vary continuously across firms. This construction 
parallels the equity issuance-based “characteristic spreads” used in Greenwood and Hanson (2012). It 
is straightforward to show that all three measures are decreasing in expected returns δt. While ISSt is 
the measure we emphasize in the majority of the paper, we show that our findings are not sensitive to 
the specific method we use to measure issuer quality. 
II.  Measuring Debt Issuer Quality 
A.  Compustat-based measures of issuer quality: 1962-2008 
Following the above discussion, we compare the credit quality of firms issuing large amounts 
of debt to that of firms issuing little debt or who are retiring debt. Specifically, in each year t, we 
compute 
      
        ,
it it
it it
EDF
t
it it iH i g h d iL o w d
High d Low d
tt
ISS
EDF EDF
NN
  
 
(8) 
                                                            
5 To see the intuition, consider the related exercise of forecasting stock returns using equity issuance and the dividend 
yield. Suppose a Gordon growth model holds, so D/P reflects expected returns and dividend growth – i.e., D/P = R – G. If 
issuance responds mechanically to D/P, it will have no incremental forecasting power. If, however, issuance responds 
differently to changes in R than changes in G, it may contain additional information beyond D/P.  
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where EDF is an estimate of the firm’s default probability,  1 / it it it dD A     denotes debt issuance, 
and N denotes the number of firms. Debt issuance is the change in assets minus the change in book 
equity from Compustat, scaled by lagged assets. ISS
EDF compares the average default probability of 
high net debt issuers (net debt issuance in the top NYSE quintile) with the default probability of low 
net debt issuers (net debt issuance in the bottom NYSE quintile). Thus, ISS
EDF takes on high values 
when debt issuers are of relatively poor credit quality. 
EDF is the Merton (1974) expected default frequency, computed following Bharath and 
Shumway (2008).
6 A simple way to think of EDF is that it is a statistical equivalent of a credit rating, 
albeit one that we can compute reliably for a larger sample of firms starting in 1963.
7 Highly levered 
firms with high asset volatility and low expected returns have the highest EDFs. Firms with high 
EDFs also tend to be small and young, do not pay dividends, have high leverage, and have low 
interest coverage. Naturally, these firms also have high estimated default probabilities based on other 
forecasters, such as the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy hazard rate. Debt issues, EDF, and several 
alternate measures of firm credit quality are summarized in Panel A of Table 1, with the details of 
their construction given in the Internet Appendix. EDF is close to zero for the median firm, while the 
mean EDF is 6%. 
When substituting a firm’s EDF into equation (8), we use NYSE deciles rather than the raw 
values. Using deciles minimizes the influence of outlier firms and avoids the possibility of picking up 
compositional shifts in the set of listed firms or secular trends.
8  It also makes the units easy to 
                                                            
6 For firm i in year t,         Φ   ln	             /           0 . 5      
   /      where Ei,t is the market value of equity, Fi,t 
is the face value of debt (computed as short-term debt plus one-half long-term debt),   ,  is the asset drift (estimated using 
the prior 12-month stock return),       is the asset volatility (estimated as       	       /                        /      
      0.05   0.25     		where      is the annualized volatility of monthly stock returns over the prior 12 months), and 
Φ ∙  is the standard normal CDF. 
 
7 From 1985-2008, the correlation between EDF decile and S&P credit ratings is 0.54 for firms with a valid rating. 
8 For example, if we wanted to see whether issuance was concentrated among large firms, it would make little sense to 
compute the average size of high issuers as the cross-sectional dispersion of size has increased over time. A limitation of 
using deciles is that we throw out information about changes in the cross-sectional dispersion of EDFit.  
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interpret:  1
EDF
t ISS   means that firms with high net debt issuance had EDFs that were on average 
one decile higher than firms with low net debt issuance.  However, as shown below, we obtain 
somewhat stronger results if we compute ISS
EDF using raw EDFs as opposed to EDF deciles. 
We plot ISS
EDF in Figure 1 and provide summary statistics for the time series in Table 1. 
Table 2 lists the entire time series. ISS
EDF was high (i.e., high debt issuers were of relatively poor 
quality) in the mid-to-late 1960s, 1973, 1978, the mid-to-late 1980s, 1997-1998, and again in 2005-
2007. ISS
EDF drops sharply in 1970-1971, 1975-1976, the early 1990s, 2001-2002, and finally in 
2008. 
Figure 1 also shows the relationship between ISS
EDF and the business cycle. The shaded bars 
denote NBER recessions. ISS
EDF tends to be low in recessions and high in expansions. However, this 
relation is not exact and the lead-lag relationship between the business cycle and ISS
EDF varies over 
time. For instance, ISS
EDF falls during many recessions, but rises during the 1982 recession as the 
1980s high yield boom was getting underway. The series also tends to peak before recessions, but 
occasionally peaks after the economy is already in recession. We can remove the influence of the 
business cycle by regressing ISS
EDF on the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filtered log real GDP) 
and saving the residuals. This orthogonalized series, shown as a dashed line in Panel B, still captures 
the same peaks and troughs of the original series, consistent with the idea that the credit cycle is 
somewhat distinct from the business cycle. 
Our time series of issuer quality corresponds closely to historical accounts of credit booms 
and busts. For example, Grant (1992) describes the credit boom of the late 1960s, when our ISS
EDF 
series reaches its sample peak. This period saw booming corporate bond issuance and the rise of the 
short-term commercial paper market, which grew from $10 billion in 1966 to over $40 billion by 
early 1970. The boom came to an abrupt end following the Penn Central commercial paper default of 
June 1970. Officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted the “deterioration in the quality 
of outstanding paper” in the run-up to Penn Central. These events are reflected in the sharp drop in  
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ISS
EDF between 1968-1969 and 1970-1971. 
The decline of issuer quality during the 1980s junk bond boom has been noted by a number of 
authors (Grant (1992) and Kaplan and Stein (1993)). Klarman (1991) notes that financier Michael 
Milken marketed new issue junk bonds on the assumption that their default rates would be similar to 
those of recent high yield issues. However, default rates had been low due to strong economic growth 
in an environment of declining interest rates. Klarman argues that the denominator in the default rate 
calculation soared during the issuance boom, leading investors to underestimate the likelihood of 
future defaults (Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff (1989)). 
The robust credit markets of the mid-to-late 1990s and 2004-2007 are by now familiar. 
However, ISS
EDF is unlikely to capture the full extent of the 2004-2007 boom, because it is based on 
corporate credit, whereas much of the credit growth and deterioration in borrower quality during this 
period was in residential mortgages and structured products (see e.g., Demyanyk and Hemert (2011)). 
While we do not expect ISS
EDF to capture the full scale of this activity, the basic arc of the boom is 
apparent in Figure 1. 
Panel B of Table 1 also summarizes alternate time-series measures of issuer quality, 
constructed similarly to ISS
EDF. We follow the same procedure as in equation (8), but use different 
firm characteristics to proxy for credit quality. For example, ISS
Intcov is the difference between the 
average interest coverage (decile) of high and low debt issuers. In each case, we order characteristics 
so that high values of the ISS variable indicate years in which lower credit quality firms are issuing 
debt. These measures of quality are all highly correlated over time. 
B.  The high yield share: 1926-2008 
A second quality measure can be formed using the credit ratings assigned to new corporate 
bond issues. We define the high yield share as the share of nonfinancial corporate bond issuance in 
each year with a high yield rating from Moody’s  
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, t
it HighYield
it it HighYield InvGrade
HYS
B
B B



  
(9) 
where Bi,t denotes the principal value of bond i issued in year t.
9 In our forecasting regressions, we 
take the log of the raw share so that our regression coefficients can be interpreted as the change in 
returns following a one percent change in HYS.
10  We use the Mergent Fixed Income Security 
Database (FISD) to construct HYS from 1983-2008. We extend the series from 1926-1965 using data 
from NBER studies by Hickman (1960) and Atkinson (1967) who report aggregate issuance by credit 
rating based on a compilation of bond issues from Moody’s Bond Surveys. Aggregate issues by 
credit rating are not available from 1966-1982, so we hand-collect information on bond offerings 
from weekly editions of these books.
11 
Figure 2 plots HYS alongside ISS
EDF for comparison, and Table 2 lists the HYS values. Similar 
to ISS
EDF, HYS takes on high values when issuer quality is poor. The data show a small high yield 
debt boom in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and a more substantial boom in the late 1960s. 
Corporate bond issuers were of particularly low quality in the late 1980s, in 1997 and 1998, and again 
in 2004 and 2005. There is a clear regime shift between the first and second halves of the sample: the 
level and volatility of HYS are much higher starting in the early 1980s. The correlation between HYS 
and ISS
EDF is 0.47 prior to 1982, and 0.58 after 1982. 
                                                            
9 High yield bonds are those rated Ba1 or lower by Moody's or BB+ or lower by SS&P. For simplicity, we use the S&P 
nomenclature (e.g., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and C) throughout, even when working with Moody's data. 
 
10 We use log(HYS) because it provides a good fit, but qualitatively similar results obtain if we forecast returns using HYS. 
To compute log(HYS), we need to address the fact that HYS = 0 in 1974. To do so, we set HYS equal to 0.0024 for 1974 
before applying the log transformation (0.0024 is the second lowest value of HYS observed in sample). However, our 
treatment of this single observation does not play an important role in driving our results. 
 
11 FISD is the current incarnation of the Moody’s Bond Survey, so we are essentially using the same primary source 
throughout. We start using FISD in 1983 because FISD only contains bonds that mature in 1990 or later. So long as 
speculative and investment grades issues have similar maturity distributions, this truncation should impart no bias to HYS. 
We exclude financials, asset-backed securities, sovereigns, and exchange offers to preserve comparability with Hickman 
(1960) and Atkinson (1967). The amount of bond offerings by Moody’s rating from 1926-1943 is from Table V2 of 
Hickman (1960) and data from 1944-1965 is from Table B-1 of Atkinson (1967). Following Atkinson and Hickman, we 
include convertible issues from 1966-1982. Prior to the surge in high yield issuance in the 1980s, many speculative grade 
issues contained conversion features.  
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The advantage of HYS is its simplicity. However, there are several reasons to prefer ISS
EDF. 
First,  ISS
EDF reflects a broader measure of debt issues, including both loan and bond market 
financing.
12 This means that unlike HYS, ISS
EDF is not be impacted by secular shifts in the relative 
sizes of the markets for low-grade bonds and low-grade loans. Since the sizes of these markets have 
fluctuated over time – the most prominent example being the rapid growth of the high yield bond 
market in the early 1980s – this is a major strength of ISS
EDF. Indeed, the level of HYS is considerably 
lower prior to the early 1980s.
13 Second, if loan and bond markets are partially integrated components 
of the broader corporate credit market, measures based on total debt issuance (loans plus bonds) may 
be more informative about future bond returns than measures based solely on bond issuance. 
Specifically, if firms willingly substitute between loans and bonds, isolated shocks to bank loan 
supply would induce a positive relationship between bond issuance and expected excess bond returns. 
However, the relationship between total debt issuance and expected excess bond returns would 
remain negative, even in the presence isolated loan supply shocks.
14 Third, ISS
EDF holds constant the 
definition of firm quality. HYS, in contrast, relies on the assumption that the meaning of credit ratings 
has remained constant. However, Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) and Baghai, Servaes, and 
Tamayo (2010) argue that the agencies have become more conservative in assigning ratings since the 
late 1970s. Fourth, ISS
EDF is based on net rather than gross debt issuance, thus better capturing 
changes in the financial position of low quality firms. 
                                                            
12 Empirically,  ISS
EDF  appears to partially reflect changes in bank lending standards: changes in ISS
EDF are -0.51 
correlated with the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of changes in the stricture of bank lending 
standards from 1967-1983 (see Lown and Morgan (2006)) and 1990-2008. 
 
13 We can compute bonds outstanding as a share of total loans and bonds for non-financial corporations from Table 102 of 
the Flow of Funds. This “bond share” fell steadily from 52% in 1962 to 39% in 1984 and then gradually rose again to 
61% by 2003. This trend reversed from 2004-2008 as the bond share again fell to 56%, reflecting the rapid growth of the 
leveraged loan market. 
 
14 To see why, suppose that lending standards are relaxed, while bond investment standards remain unchanged. Since 
corporations substitute between loans and bonds (see e.g., Becker and Ivashina (2010)), banks’ willingness to grant cheap 
credit would raise loan issuance, lower bond issuance, and lower expected bond excess returns. However, total debt 
issuance would rise. In summary, assuming partial substitutability between bonds and loans, total debt issuance is likely 
to be better reflection of broad credit supply, which in turn drives expected excess bond returns.  
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Figure 2 illustrates a final limitation of HYS as a measure of issuer quality: it can be unduly 
volatile in years in which total issuance (the denominator in equation (9)) is particularly low. This is 
most problematic in 1933 – the historical low point for total issuance, representing a near collapse of 
the corporate bond market. Because investment grade issuance fell even more dramatically than high 
yield issuance in 1933, HYS spikes to its sample maximum at the nadir of the Great Depression. 
While we use the full time-series of HYS in the analysis that follows, we note that removing this 
single outlier significantly strengthens our forecasting results. 
C.  Returns and other data 
Our remaining time series are summarized in Panel D of Table 1. Short-term government 
bond yields (
G
St y ) and the term spread (
GG
Lt St y y  ) are from Ibbotson. The credit spread (
BBB G
Lt Lt y y  ) is 
the difference between the log yield of the Moody’s BBB corporate index and the log long-term 
government bond yield from Ibbotson. Business cycle controls include real industrial production 
growth from the Federal Reserve, real aggregate consumption growth from the BEA National Income 
and Product Accounts, and a dummy variable indicating whether the year is classified as a recession 
by the NBER. As an alternate business cycle control, we use Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filtered log real 
GDP as a measure of the output gap. We also use the consumption wealth ratio (cay) from Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001) and the eight principal components that Ludvigson and Ng (2010) extract from 132 
macroeconomic and financial time series. 
Returns on high yield bonds are from Morningstar/Ibbotson from 1927-1982 and from 
Barclays Capital (formerly Lehman Brothers) starting in 1983. We construct high yield excess returns 
by subtracting the log return on intermediate Treasuries from Ibbotson:  111 .
HYH Y G
ttt rx r r   
Intermediate Treasuries (with a maturity of approximately 5 years) are the appropriate benchmark for  
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high yield bonds since the average duration on the Barclay’s high yield index is just under 5 years.
15 
Excess returns on BBB-rated corporate bonds ( 111
BBB BBB G
ttt rx r r     ) and AAA-rated bonds (
111
AAA AAA G
ttt rx r r   ) are calculated in a similar fashion using Morningstar/Ibbotson data from 1927-
1989 and Barclays data beginning in 1990. We compute 2- and 3- year cumulative log excess returns 
by summing 1-year log excess returns. 
III.  Issuer quality and excess corporate bond returns 
A.  Univariate forecasting regressions 
Figure 3 shows the main result. We plot ISS
EDF against cumulative high yield excess returns 
over the following 2 years. Returns are plotted in reverse scale, so the negative correlation appears 
positive visually. The correlation between the two series is -0.51. Simply put, periods of poor issuer 
quality are followed by low excess returns on corporate bonds. 
Table 3 shows forecasting regressions of cumulative excess returns on quality measures 
,
HY
t tk tk rx a b X u      (10) 
where k denotes a forecast horizon of 1-, 2-, or 3-years and X is either ISS
EDF or log(HYS). Moving 
from left to right, we present forecasting regressions for ISS
EDF for 1962-2008 and the 1983-2008 
subsample, and HYS for 1926-2008 and the 1983-2008 subsample. We isolate the 1983-2008 period 
which corresponds to the modern high yield bond market. Moving from top to bottom, the three 
panels show separate regressions for the excess returns on high yield, BBB-rated, and AAA-rated 
corporate bonds. Here and in subsequent tables, t-statistics for k-year regressions are based on 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors, allowing for serial correlation up to k lags.  
The top-left regression in Panel A shows that ISS
EDF has an R
2 of 12% for high yield excess 
                                                            
15 Ibbotson bond return data are also used by Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1989), and Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010). Ibbotson returns are based on a sample of corporate bonds with a remaining maturity 
greater than one year. The Barclays Capital U.S. High Yield Index covers the universe of U.S. dollar high yield corporate 
debt. Index-eligible issues must be fixed-rate, non-convertible, have a remaining maturity of at least one year, and have an 
outstanding par value of at least $150 million. The value-weighted index return includes the price return that is realized 
upon the event of default.  
17 
 
returns at a 1-year horizon. The coefficient of -9.534 implies that a one standard deviation rise in 
ISS
EDF (0.47 deciles) lowers excess high yield returns by 4.5% over the following year, about 0.35 
standard deviations. Thus, the level of predictability is strong in economic terms.
16 
As we lengthen the forecast horizon from 1-year to 3-years, the R
2 grows to 29% and the 
coefficients increase in magnitude. Specifically, the coefficient on ISS
EDF is -9.534 at a 1-year 
horizon, -15.254 at a 2-year horizon, and -17.301 at a 3-year horizon. In untabulated results, we 
extend this analysis to longer horizons, estimating equation (10) for horizons up to six years. The 
forecasting power is concentrated in the first two years, with some additional power at three years, 
after which it levels off. 
Moving down Table 3, the coefficients in Panel A for high yield bonds can be compared to 
those for BBB-rated and AAA-rated bonds in Panels B and C. The coefficient on ISS
EDF declines in 
magnitude from -9.534 when forecasting 1-year high yield returns, to -5.311 when forecasting BBB 
returns, and -2.278 when forecasting AAA returns. This pattern of coefficients, apparent throughout 
Table 3, is consistent with the model in Section I in which lower-rated bonds have greater exposure 
to a common credit-related factor. Moving to the right, Table 3 shows that the forecasting power of 
ISS
EDF is present in both the full 1962-2008 sample as well as the modern 1983-2008 subsample. 
The right half of Table 3 shows specifications involving log(HYS) as the predictor. Starting 
with the full 1926-2008 sample, the coefficient of -1.517 for 1-year returns implies that a one percent 
increase in HYS reduces high yield excess returns by -1.517%. In the 1983-2008 subsample, the 
corresponding coefficient is -11.483, so the relation between HYS and subsequent returns is 
economically and statistically stronger than in the full sample. Because HYS was formed by splicing 
together several separate time-series, we estimate the forecasting regression for various additional 
                                                            
16 As can be seen in Figure 3, high levels of ISS
EDF predict low or negative high yield excess returns. Conversely, low 
levels of ISSEDF predict large positive excess returns. Furthermore, the impact of high and low values of ISS
EDF is 
roughly symmetric. Let     
   m a x 	                       ,0  and     
   m i n 	                       ,0 . If we estimate      
          ∙
    
       ∙       
        , we obtain b+ = -12.786 (t = -2.30) and b₋ = -17.008 (t = -3.24). However, the difference 
between b+ and b₋ is not significant.  
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subsamples in the Internet Appendix. The results for the individual subsamples are generally stronger 
than the full 1926-2008 sample results. (The single exception is the 1926-1943 period which is 
heavily influenced by the outlying 1933 observation.) Overall, a consistent picture emerges whether 
we forecast returns using ISS
EDF or HYS and when we consider earlier or more recent subsamples. 
What do these results imply for variation in the real cost of credit faced by firms? To translate 
the regression coefficients into an annualized cost of credit, we divide the 3-year regression 
coefficient (our proxy for the long-run impact on the price of the bond) of -17.301 by the average 
duration of high yield bonds of 5 years which gives us -3.46. This implies that a one-standard 
deviation increase in ISS
EDF of 0.48 units is associated with a reduction in the cost of credit for high-
yield firms of 1.66 = 0.48×3.46 percentage points. Repeating the same exercise for BBB firms, we 
find that a one-standard deviation increase in ISS
EDF is associated with a 0.63 percentage point 
reduction in the cost of credit, which is roughly one standard deviation of the BBB credit spread 
(Table 1, Panel D). These calculations suggest that a large portion of the fluctuations in credit spreads 
reflect changes in the pricing of credit risk, which in turn has significant implications for the quantity 
and average quality of corporate debt financing. This reinforces findings in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 
(2011), who argue that changes in credit spreads are an important predictor of business cycle 
fluctuations. 
B.  Multivariate forecasting regressions 
We now examine the incremental forecasting power of issuer quality over an exhaustive set of 
predictors that researchers have used to predict the time-series of corporate bond returns. The central 
results are shown here, with further checks discussed in the robustness section. Two sets of control 
variables are of interest. First, we want to know whether issuer quality has any forecasting power 
beyond common proxies for ex ante risk premia such as the term spread (Fama and French (1989)) or 
the T-bill yield (Fama and Schwert (1977)). Second, we want to understand to what extent the results 
in Table 3 are driven by firms responding to some degree of mean reversion in credit spreads or  
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excess returns. If issuer quality were driven out by credit spreads, our findings might still be 
interesting from an economic perspective, but would be less useful for forecasting returns. 
Is it reasonable to think that issuance could contain incremental information about returns that 
is not contained in other observables such as credit spreads? If managers respond naively to changes 
in credit spreads, then the answer is no. However, as suggested in Section I, spreads mean different 
things at different times: they may be wide because expected credit losses are high, or because 
expected returns are high. If managers issue more when they perceive credit as being “cheap” (i.e., 
expected returns are low), then issuance may contain information beyond spreads. The same logic 
can be extended to other observable variables. If credit valuations are multi-dimensional, then 
corporate issuance decisions may integrate these disparate factors into a single statistic that is 
informative about returns. If we could condition on all relevant observables, issuance might become 
redundant in a forecasting regression. In practice, it may be difficult for the econometrician to 
identify the full set of relevant conditioning variables. 
Table 4 shows return forecasting regressions of the form 
() ( ) ,
HY G G G BBB G HY
tk t L t S t S t L t L t t tk rx a b X c y y d y e y y f rx u             (11) 
where  X again denotes ISS
EDF or log(HYS). Because low-grade bonds should have the strongest 
exposure to any common credit-related factors, we focus on high yield returns in Table 4 and in the 
remainder of the text. (However, in the Internet Appendix we show that similar multivariate 
forecasting results hold for BBB bonds.) As before, Table 4 forecasts 1-, 2- and 3-year cumulative 
excess returns. Controlling for the term spread and the T-bill yield has little impact on the coefficient 
on ISS
EDF. For example, in the univariate forecasting regression in Table 3, the slope coefficient on 
ISS
EDF is -9.534 at a 1-year horizon, and falls in magnitude to -7.636 when these controls are added. 
The effects of the control variables are even more modest at 2- and 3-year forecast horizons. In the 
case of HYS  for the full-1926-2008 sample, the coefficient on log(HYS) in the multivariate 
regressions actually larger in magnitude and more significant, than in the corresponding univariate  
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regressions. In the 1983-2008 subsample, controlling for the credit spread and past high yield returns 
has a larger impact on the log(HYS) coefficient at a 1-year horizon. However, once we extend the 
forecast horizon to 2- and 3-years, these controls have little impact on the estimates and log(HYS) 
remains statistically significant. 
C.  The quantity and quality of debt issuance over the credit cycle 
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between aggregate credit growth, the quality of 
debt issuance, and excess corporate bond returns. There is no mechanical relationship between the 
quality of debt issuance and aggregate credit growth, yet it is natural to think the two would be 
positively correlated, and indeed such a relationship is predicted by our discussion in Section I. We 
show that while aggregate credit growth forecasts bond returns, focusing on the credit growth of low 
quality firms is even more powerful. Reminiscent of Hickman (1958), Atkinson (1967), and 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), this exercise suggests that variation in credit quality is a 
defining feature of the credit cycle. 
We start by documenting the correlation between quantity and quality. Figure 4 shows the 
strong correlation between issuer quality and aggregate credit growth. We calculate aggregate debt 
growth, DAgg/DAgg, as the change in debt amongst non-financial Compustat firms, scaled by the 
lagged debt of firms reporting in successive years. The correlation between ISS
EDF and DAgg/DAgg  is 
0.45.
17 Another way to illustrate the relationship between aggregate credit growth and issuer quality 
is to group Compustat firms into EDF quintiles, compute aggregate debt growth for each group, and 
then regress each debt growth series (denoted D1/D1 to D5/D5) on aggregate debt growth, 
DAgg/DAgg. This exercise shows that D5/D5 has the largest loading on DAgg/DAgg with b = 1.31 (t = 
6.80), while D1/D1 has smallest loading, with b = 0.71 (t = 8.13). Thus, if aggregate debt grows by 
1.0%, the debt of high quality firms grows by 0.7%, while debt at low quality firms grows by 1.3%. 
                                                            
17 Aggregate credit growth for non-financial corporations can also be calculated from Table 102 of the Flow of Funds. 
The correlation between ISS
EDF and this measure of credit growth is 0.68.  
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A number of previous studies use corporate securities issuance to forecast returns (e.g., 
Loughran and Ritter (1995)).
18 It is natural to ask whether there is anything special about issuer 
quality per se – i.e., is there information in who is borrowing over and above the total quantity of 
borrowing? In Table 5, we compare the forecasting power of issuer quality with that of aggregate 
credit growth. As argued in Section I, if debt issuance is partially driven by time variation in expected 
excess returns, the quantity and quality of debt issuance should both negatively forecast returns. 
However, if uninformative common shocks affect the issuance of all firms, we might expect issuer 
quality to outperform aggregate credit growth in a horserace. 
Table 5 shows forecasting regressions of cumulative 2-year high yield excess returns without 
controls in Panel A and with controls in Panel B. The first three columns compare the forecasting 
power of ISS
EDF to aggregate credit growth from Compustat, DAgg/DAgg. While DAgg/DAgg 
negatively forecasts returns, the horserace in column (3) shows that DAgg/DAgg has little incremental 
forecasting power over and above ISS
EDF. 
In a related exercise, columns (4) to (8) of Table 5 compare the forecasting power of debt 
growth for firms in EDF quintiles 1 to 5, denoted D1/D1 to D5/D5. To preserve comparability 
across columns, each series is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The table 
shows that debt growth amongst low quality firms contains the most valuable information about 
future corporate bond returns. Specifically, moving across columns (4)-(8), the economic and 
statistical significance rises as we consider debt growth of lower quality firms. For example, a one 
standard deviation rise in D1/D1 lowers returns by 3.47% over the following 2 years, while a one 
standard deviation in D5/D5 lowers returns by 7.09%. When we include time-series controls in Panel 
B, debt growth of high quality firms (D1/D1 and D2/D2) is only marginally significant whereas that 
of low quality firms (D4/D4 and D5/D5) remains highly significant. 
                                                            
18 See also Fama and French (2008), and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) for firm-level stock returns; Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) and Greenwood and Hanson (2012) for equity market and equity-factor returns; and Baker, Greenwood, and 
Wurgler (2003) for excess government bond returns.  
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We can also include debt growth among high and low quality firms jointly as predictive 
variables. In the horserace between D1/D1 and D5/D5 shown in column (9), only D5/D5 remains 
significant. Alternately, we can examine the difference in debt growth between low quality and high 
quality firms, D5/D5 – D1/D1. This construction, which corresponds to 
**
Ht Lt dd   in equation (6), is a 
different way to measure issuer quality.
19 As shown in column (10), D5/D5 – D1/D1 negatively 
forecasts future returns, and this remains true if we control for debt growth at high quality firms in 
column (11). The bottom line is that much of the forecasting power of aggregate credit growth 
derives from credit growth at the lowest quality firms.
20 
D.  Robustness 
Table 6 shows robustness specifications with and without our baseline set of controls (the 
yield spread, the T-bill yield, the credit spread, and lagged excess high yield returns). In addition to 
the discussion below, the Internet Appendix describes further robustness checks.  
Our basic result holds in a variety of subsamples, including pre-1983, post-1983, and 
dropping 2008-2009. Although Compustat has less reliable coverage prior to 1962, we can also 
extend ISS
EDF back until 1952, obtaining similar results over this longer 57-year sample. The table 
also suggests that the forecasting relationship has grown statistically and economically stronger in 
recent years. 
We next add a number of additional control variables to our baseline forecasting regression. 
We first consider a variety of business-cycle controls. Row (6) includes the real output gap as a 
control, while row (7) adds real consumption growth, real industrial production growth, and a 
                                                            
19 ISS
EDF compares the EDFs of high and low debt issuance firms. By contrast, D5/D5 – D1/D1 compares the debt 
growth of high and low EDF firms: the correlation between this series and ISS
EDF is 0.52. 
 
20 As shown in the Internet Appendix, the finding that low quality issuance is most useful for forecasting returns also 
emerges in our bond issuance data. Specifically, we can compute the growth in high yield and investment grade issuance, 
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   is the volume of high yield issuance in 
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recession dummy as controls. The most extreme of these tests is row (8) which includes both lagged 
and  future values of these business cycle controls. ISS
EDF still retains its forecasting power, 
suggesting that its power does not derive – at least not exclusively – from its ability to predict future 
macro conditions.
21  We also include the 8 principal components that Ludvigson and Ng (2010) 
extract from 132 macroeconomic and financial variables. This has little impact on our results. 
We next add several forecasting variables studied in the recent literature. Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001) find that the consumption wealth ratio (cay) predicts stock market returns. 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that a tent-shaped linear combination of forward interest rates 
forecasts the excess returns of long-term riskless bonds over short-term bonds. However, adding 
either variable as a control has almost no impact on the estimated coefficient on ISS
EDF. 
Another concern is that our results could be due to mechanical Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
effect: holding fixed the expected return on firm assets, a decline in firm leverage should 
mechanically lower the expected return on debt and equity. Empirically, however, we expect 
aggregate leverage to rise during booms when issuer quality is poor, so the Modigliani-Miller effect 
suggests that excess corporate bond returns should be high during these periods—the exact opposite 
of what we find. To address this concern concretely, we construct a measure of nonfinancial 
corporate leverage from the Flow of Funds. As expected, aggregate corporate leverage tends to rise 
when issuer quality is low. Furthermore, as shown in row (12) of Table 6, our return forecasting 
results are robust to controlling for aggregate corporate leverage. 
We then make various adjustments to the construction ISS
EDF in equation (8). As discussed 
above, using the raw level of EDF rather than the EDF decile strengthens our basic result in both 
univariate and multivariate specifications. We then examine the role of long-term versus short-term 
debt issuance (we follow Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) in the computation of long-term 
and short-term debt issuance). These results suggest that the quality mix of long-term debt issuers is 
                                                            
21  Lown and Gertler (1999) and Stock and Watson (2003) find that high yield spreads forecast near-term GDP 
innovations.  
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quite informative about returns, while the quality mix of short-term issuers is less so. This is to be 
expected given that major short-term debt issuers are almost always of exceptionally high credit 
quality. As mentioned above, we also obtain similar results if we compute the value weighted average 
EDF decile amongst high and low debt issuers (weighting by assets or total debt issued), or if we 
exclude financial firms. In summary, our results do not appear to be sensitive to variable 
construction. 
One might wonder whether our results are sensitive to how we measure firm credit quality, 
namely using a Merton-style expected default frequency. For instance, Shumway (2001) provides an 
empirical model of bankruptcy with higher predictive power than the Merton model. In row (19), we 
use Shumway’s bankruptcy predictor (as opposed to EDF) in equation (8) and find that the resulting 
time-series, ISS
SHUM, is also a strong predictor of returns. In rows (20)-(25), we perform a similar 
exercise with other measures of firm credit quality, in each case constructing ISS
Char so that high 
values indicate disproportionate issuance from lower credit quality firms. We examine interest 
coverage, leverage, stock return volatility, size, age, and payout policy. All of these measures line up 
in the right direction, and in 6 out of 7 cases, ISS
Char is statistically significant. 
The final two rows of Table 6 explore the link between ISS
EDF and the equity market. We can 
control for contemporaneous equity excess returns (MKTRF), or, in the last line, for realizations of 
the three Fama-French (1993) factors, MKTRF, SMB, and HML. To be clear, the factors are 
contemporaneous with the bond returns on the left-hand side of the regression. The controls do not 
meaningfully affect our results, suggesting that we are picking up alpha in our forecasting 
regressions. 
Last, our results are potentially subject to the econometric issues that arise in return 
forecasting regressions. In an Internet Appendix, we discuss these issues and conduct a number of 
time-series robustness checks. We consider alternate procedures for computing standard errors, 
including a moving-blocks bootstrap and parametric standard errors computed under the assumption  
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that residuals follow an ARMA process. We also examine the possible impact of Stambaugh (1999) 
bias on our results. None of these adjustments alter our basic conclusions. 
E.  Forecasting changes in credit spreads and future defaults 
Ideally, we would like to relate the initial quality of a cohort of bonds to holding period 
returns on that cohort. Such cohort-level information is not available, so we use the holding period 
return on bond indices composed of issues with a fixed credit rating. Excess returns on a portfolio of 
low grade bonds are a function of the initial spread, the subsequent change in spreads on non-
defaulted bonds, and realized default and recovery rates: 
11 1 1 1 (1 ) [ ( )] , tt tt t t t rx DEF s Dur s s DEF LGD             where  1 t DEF   is the default rate,  t s  is 
the credit spread, Dur  is bond duration, and  1 t LGD   is the loss-given-default. Table 7 shows that 
high values of ISS
EDF forecast both future increases in credit spreads as well as high future default 
rates. Specifically, the left panel of Table 7 reports the results of regressions where we use ISS
EDF to 
forecast cumulative changes in the Moody’s BBB credit spread over the following 1-, 2-, and 3-year 
periods. ISS
EDF is a strong univariate forecaster of credit spread changes and remains significant in 
multivariate specifications that also control for the initial level of credit spreads. The right panel 
shows that ISS
EDF is a reliable forecaster of future default rates on high yield bonds over the 
subsequent five years. Specifically, we use ISS
EDF  to forecast the k-year ahead issuer-weighted 
default rate on high yield bonds from Moody’s Annual Default Survey,
HY
tk DEF   for k = 1 to 3.  
IV.  Discussion 
The previous section demonstrates that deteriorating debt issuer credit quality forecasts low 
excess returns on corporate bonds. This section evaluates potential explanations of the underlying 
variation in expected returns. We first consider explanations in which the quantity or rational price of 
risk varies over the credit cycle. Next, we discuss frictional explanations that emphasize changes in 
the willingness of financial intermediaries to take on credit risk. Finally, we examine explanations in  
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which investor over-extrapolation plays a role. 
A.  Time variation in the quantity of risk 
We first rule out explanations in which expected returns are mechanically linked to the 
composition of bonds in the high yield index. Specifically, the most natural arguments suggest that 
lower quality issuance should be associated with a larger quantity of risk, forecasting returns in the 
opposite direction of our findings. For instance, suppose the risk-premium on C-rated bonds is greater 
than that on B-rated bonds, which is greater than that on BB-rated bonds. This is what we might 
expect given that factor loadings on excess stock market returns (MKTRF) are largest for the lowest 
quality issues. Thus, a shift towards lower quality issuance should increase – not lower – the expected 
return on the high yield index as the average loadings on priced risk factors rise. 
More generally, since the correlation between high yield excess returns and MKTRF may be 
time-varying, one might wonder if our results can be explained by a conditional-CAPM (e.g., high 
levels of ISS
EDF might signal low future loadings on excess stock market returns). However, we find 
that high values of ISS
EDF are associated with higher, not lower, future loadings of rx
HY on excess 
stock market returns. 
B.  Fluctuations in the rationally determined price of risk 
We now consider explanations in which time-variation in required returns is due to changes in 
the rationally determined price of risk. Countercyclical fluctuations in the price of risk arise in many 
consumption-based asset pricing models, such as those featuring habit formation (Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999)), time-varying consumption volatility (Bansal and Yaron (2004)), or time-varying 
consumption disaster risk (Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2011)).
22 Under such explanations, a decline in 
investors’ required returns during booms leads to a decline in issuer quality because changes in the 
                                                            
22  Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) argue that the habit formation models can explain the low level of 
defaults relative to the BBB-AAA spread if default losses are countercyclical. Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2008) and 
Chen (2009) combine consumption-based models in the long-run risks traditional with dynamic models of optimal capital 
structure. 
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price of risk have a greater impact on the investment (and hence debt issuance) decisions of low 
quality firms.
23 Under such explanations, investors are not systematically surprised when the bonds of 
low quality firms who receive funding during booms later underperform. 
Several of our findings are consistent with the idea that the rationally determined price of risk 
moves in a countercyclical fashion. Specifically, issuer quality has a clear business cycle component. 
In addition, adding macroeconomic controls often increases the R
2 in our forecasting regressions, 
while slightly reducing the magnitude of the coefficient on ISS
EDF. Our forecasting results are also 
strongest for lower-rated bonds, consistent with the idea that lower-rated bonds may be more highly 
exposed to consumption risk. 
However, several of our findings are more difficult to square with rational integrated-markets 
explanations. First, as previously shown in Table 6, the forecasting power of ISS
EDF remains quite 
strong if we control for a host of macroeconomic variables, future realizations of macroeconomic 
variables, as well as the eight principal components Ludvigson and Ng (2010) extract from 132 
macroeconomic and financial time series. 
Second, issuer quality forecasts statistically significant negative excess returns on high yield 
bonds in a number of sample years. While consumption-based models with a rationally time-varying 
price of risk can explain periods in which high yield bonds command a larger or smaller risk 
premium, they generally do not generate negative risk premia. More formally, so long as the 
covariance of the stochastic discount factor with excess credit returns is negative – i.e., so long as 
credit assets are expected to underperform Treasuries during bad times, then consumption-based 
models would always generate positive expected excess returns for high yield bonds. Since almost 
any risk-based model of equilibrium expected returns implies this non-negativity restriction, this 
                                                            
23 Suppose firms have access to projects that require an investment of I at t, yield E[CF] in expectation at t+1, and differ 
only in their risk exposure, i. Firm i undertakes a bond offering and invests if I  ≤ E [CF]/Et[rxit+1] or 
i ≤   
∗ =E[CF]/(It)The factor loading of the marginal issuing firm,	  
∗, and the average issuing firm, E[i | i≤     
∗ ] 
are decreasing in δt. According to this interpretation, changes in the price of risk affect the quality of the marginal firm 
that is investing and issuing debt.  
28 
 
approach to testing asset pricing models mitigates the joint hypothesis problem noted by Fama 
(1970). As such, it has been used by Fama and Schwert (1977), Fama and French (1988), Kothari and 
Shanken (1997), and Baker and Wurgler (2000).  
Specifically, each year we forecast k-period cumulative excess returns, compute the standard 
error of the fitted value, and count the number of years in which expected returns are negative with 
95% confidence. ISS
EDF has forecast significantly negative 3-year cumulative excess returns in 14 
years since 1962, and all but one of these years was actually followed by negative excess returns. 
ISS
EDF has also forecast significantly negative excess returns at a 1-year and 2-year horizon in 7 and 
14 sample years, respectively. We also find that ISS
EDF forecasts significantly negative excess returns 
on BBB bonds over 1- and 2-year horizons on five occasions, four of which were followed by 
negative excess returns.
24 We can also estimate nonlinear forecasting models which nest the null that 
expected returns are always non-negative, enabling us to directly test this constraint. These tests are 
discussed in the Internet Appendix and indicate that the null of non-negative expected returns is 
strongly rejected by the data. 
Third, the magnitude of the predictability we document may be difficult to square with 
frictionless stories in which the price of risk varies over time. As discussed in Campbell and 
Thompson (2008) and Welch and Goyal (2008), it is useful to examine the out-of-sample forecasting 
power of a return predictor. Specifically, we compute out-of-sample R
2 using 
22 2
11 ˆ 1( ( ) ) / ( ( ) ) ,
TT
tt tt OS ts ts R r xr x r xr x
         (12) 
where  ˆ t rx  is the fitted value from the forecasting regression estimated through time t-1 and  t rx  is the 
                                                            
24 We obtain similar results if we include higher powers of ISS
EDF or if we include additional time-series controls. Another 
concern is that the average excess return of high yield bonds is fairly low in our sample. We can deal with this concern by 
setting a lower threshold. For instance, there are 12, 7, and 5 years in which the fitted 2-year excess return is significantly 
less than -1%, -2%, and -3%, respectively. Alternately, we can work with simple excess returns, raising the average due to 
Jensen’s inequality. Specifically, the average log excess return is 0.45% versus an average simple excess return of 1.15%. 
However, if we work with simple excess returns, we predict significantly negative excess returns in almost the exact same 
number of years. 
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average excess return estimated through t-1.
25 We find large out-of-sample R
2 statistics:
2 8.3%  OS R 
when using ISS
EDF to forecast 1-year returns, 
2 16.9%  OS R   for 2-year returns, and 
2 10.5% OS R  for 
3-year returns. As noted by Campbell and Thompson (2008), a large R
2 relative to an asset’s Sharpe 
ratio implies large market-timing gains for mean-variance investors with stable preferences. The 
annual Sharpe-ratio of our high yield excess return series is 4%, so an R
2 of 8% implies that a mean-
variance investor could increase her expected excess return by a factor of 54 by observing ISS
EDF.
26 It 
is difficult to square the magnitude of such predictability with fully-rational and frictionless stories, 
even ones with meaningful fluctuations in the price of risk. 
Fourth, we showed previously in Table 6 that ISS
EDF is largely disconnected from traditional 
predictors of the stock market. For instance, we obtain similar results controlling for the dividend 
yield or Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001) cay. In addition, while ISS
EDF is a reliable forecaster of 
excess credit returns, it has little ability to forecast stock market returns. However, we do find that 
ISS
EDF has some ability to negatively forecast the Fama and French (1993) HML and SMB factors. 
Nonetheless, as previously shown in Table 6, the coefficient and significance of ISS
EDF when 
forecasting high yield excess returns are largely unchanged even if we control for contemporaneous 
realizations of the Fama and French (1993) factors or the term premium. While this does not rule out 
risk-based explanations more broadly, it suggests that issuer quality captures forces that are relatively 
specific to credit markets. This is consistent with Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), who 
argue that credit spreads may be driven by localized supply and demand shocks. 
                                                            
25 Following Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Welch and Goyal (2008), we use 20 years of data to fit our initial 
forecasting regression for annual returns from 1953 to 1972, so our first return forecast is for 1973. 
 
26 A mean-variance investor with risk aversion   earns an expected excess return of       where S is the Sharpe ratio. 
However, an investor who observes the forecasting variable earns an average expected excess return of         
   / 1      , so the percentage increase is    / 1        1      /   . The magnitude of predictability we document 
for high yield bonds is generally greater than that found in the stock market, particularly in the post-war period. 
Specifically, an out-of-sample R
2 of 8% exceeds the statistics that Welch and Goyal (2008) obtain for univariate forecasts 
of annual stock returns. Similarly, Campbell and Thompson (2008) obtain out-of-sample R
2 statistics that are generally 
less than 5% and never exceed 8%.  
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C.  Frictional explanations linked to intermediary balance sheets 
We next consider frictional explanations in which risk premia fluctuate due to the health of 
financial intermediary balance sheets.
27 A growing literature argues that fluctuations in intermediary 
equity capital or balance sheet health impact risk premia. Interpreting this literature broadly, the 
mechanism is one in which intermediaries become more risk averse following shocks to their capital, 
which is only rebuilt gradually due to various frictions. These theories predict that ISS
EDF will be high 
when intermediary balance sheets are strong. Additionally, since intermediary capital is the driver of 
risk premia, these theories suggest that the coefficient on ISS
EDF should be attenuated once we control 
for intermediary balance sheet strength. 
Table 8 examines the relationship between ISS
EDF and the balance sheet strength of 
intermediaries. For each measure of financial intermediary health, Zt, we first estimate its relationship 
with ISS
EDF 
() ( ) . t
G G G BBB G HY
tt Lt Lt Lt St St
EDF
t ISS a b Z e cy y d y ey y f r x            (13) 
We estimate (13) with and without the full suite of controls. These regressions are shown in the first 
two columns of Table 8. In the remaining four columns, we ask whether controlling for intermediary 
capital affects the ability of ISS
EDF to forecast bond returns. Specifically, we estimate regressions of 
the form 
2 2 12 , () ( )
HY
t t
G G G BBB G HY
tt Lt Lt Lt St St
EDF
t rx abI S S bZ u cy y d y ey y f r x                  (14) 
where Zt denotes balance sheet variables for different intermediary groups, including equity-to-asset 
ratios (E/A) and annual asset growth (dA/A), are constructed from Flow of Funds data following 
Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010). 
Which intermediaries are relevant in the present context? We first consider insurers, which 
are the single largest group of corporate bond holders according to Flow of Funds data. As shown in 
                                                            
27   See, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Garleanu and Pedersen (2010), Duffie (2010), and He and 
Krishnamurthy (2010). Many accounts of the credit cycle also emphasize a role for fluctuations in bank balance sheets, 
including Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993).  
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the first two columns of Table 8, ISS
EDF tends to be high (i.e., issuer quality is low) when insurer 
equity-to-asset ratios are high as would be predicted by these theories. However, the remaining 
columns show that including measures of insurer balance sheet strength does not alter our forecasting 
results – neither the coefficient on ISS
EDF nor its statistical significance is much changed by the 
additional controls. 
We next consider broker-dealer balance sheets. While securities brokers are not major holders 
of corporate bonds, they serve as underwriters and provide liquidity in the over-the-counter 
secondary market for corporate bonds. Furthermore, Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) find that 
broker balance sheets contain useful information about a variety of risk premia. However, we do not 
find a strong relationship between broker-dealer balance sheets and ISS
EDF. 
Last, we consider three sets of proxies for the health of bank balance sheets: balance sheet 
variables (E/A and dA/A), lagged bank stock returns, and bank loan loss provisions. Again, banks are 
not large holders of corporate bonds, but they are the main providers of corporate loans – the key 
substitute for bonds from firms’ perspective. If a shortage of bank capital raises the returns banks 
require on loans, firms should substitute from loans to bonds until the expected returns on bonds and 
loans are equated. Thus, we might expect a negative shock to bank capital to raise the required 
returns on corporate bonds. Table 10 shows that lagged bank stock returns and bank loan loss 
provisions are correlated with ISS
EDF in the expected direction. However, adding these controls 
hardly impacts the coefficient on ISS
EDF in our forecasting regressions. 
The finding that issuer quality beats proxies for intermediary balance sheet strength in a 
horserace does not mean that fluctuations in intermediary risk tolerance are unimportant. This is 
because issuer quality is an equilibrium outcome that may function as a sufficient statistic for several 
different primitive forces that drive risk premia in credit markets (including the health of 
intermediary balance sheets). If we adopt this interpretation, we might expect issuer quality to win 
head-to-head horseraces against proxies for each of those individual factors. In summary,  
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explanations involving limited intermediary capital seem go in the right direction, but do not appear 
to fully explain the predictive power of ISS
EDF.
28 
D.  An agency-based explanation: “Reaching for yield” 
An alternate intermediary-related explanation is that time-varying risk premia are not driven 
by institutions’ ability to take risk, but rather by their willingness to take risk due to agency problems. 
Rajan (2005) argues that certain institutional investors “reach for yield” when riskless interest rates 
are low or have recently fallen, hinting that the low flat yield curve of 2005-2006 may have led 
institutional investors to take on excessive risks. A number of observers have pointed to the low level 
of nominal rates as a key driver of the surge in high yield issuance in 2010. Similarly, Klarman 
(1991) argues that one impetus to the 1980s junk bond boom was from investors eager to earn the 
same high nominal returns they had earned in the early 1980s. 
Numerous forces may lead intermediaries to reach for yield. A first is that low interest rates 
make intermediaries with fixed liabilities – such as life insurers – willing to take on more asset risk. 
When interest rates are high these intermediaries can meet fixed obligations without taking on 
significant risk. By contrast, low interest rates create the equivalent of a debt overhang problem and 
lead managers to engage in risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), accepting greater risk in 
exchange for lower expected returns. A second force stems from the incentives facing investment 
managers who are compensated based on nominal absolute returns, which may also encourage risk-
shifting when interest rates are low. These agency-based explanations do not require mistaken beliefs 
on the part of investment managers, who are assumed to respond optimally to incentives. 
Furthermore, these explanations are also potentially consistent with negative expected returns. 
Further evidence on the reaching for yield hypothesis is shown in Table 9 which explores the 
time-series determinants of issuer quality from 1962-2008. We regress the level of ISS
EDF on interest 
                                                            
28 However, we note that intermediary-based theories generally would not allow for negative expected excess returns, 
contrary to our findings.  
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rates, the term spread, past high yield default rates, and past high yield excess returns 
1 () .
HY
t
EDF G G G HY
t tt Lt St St rx ISS a b y c y y d e DEF u          (15) 
We also run this regression in changes  
11 () ,
HY
tk t
EDF G G G HY
t tt Lt St St kk k k k rx ISS a b y c y y d e DEF u                   (16) 
where Δk denotes the k-year difference and  11
HY
tk t rx  denotes the excess high yield return between t-k 
and t-1 . Consistent with the reaching for yield hypothesis, ISS
EDF rises when interest rates or the term 
spread are low, or have recently fallen. Column (1) shows that the term spread and T-bill yield alone 
capture 44% (or 36% when looked at in changes) of the variation in ISS
EDF. However, reaching for 
yield appears unlikely to be the whole story, since, as shown in Table 4, interest rate controls do not 
affect our basic forecasting regressions. 
E.  Investor over-extrapolation and mispricing 
Finally, we consider explanations in which biased investor beliefs generate predictable 
variation in excess corporate bond returns. A natural story is that investors over-extrapolate past 
defaults or past volatility realizations, leading to time-varying mispricing of corporate bonds. For 
instance, following a period of low defaults, investors may begin to believe that low credit quality 
firms are safer than they truly are, leading them to bid up the prices of risky debt. Recognizing that 
credit is cheap, low quality firms would then issue large amounts of debt, making them even more 
likely to default in the future. As a result, issuer quality would negatively forecast excess corporate 
bond returns. 
While extrapolative expectations deviate from the rational ideal, they may not be unrealistic. 
Psychologists have shown that subjects are prone to over-extrapolation in a wide variety of settings. 
Specifically, subjects often use a “representativeness” heuristic, drawing strong conclusions from 
small samples of data (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)).  In practice, we note that many 
intermediaries use backward-looking risk management systems such as Value-at-Risk when 
extending credit. These systems may result in over-extrapolation, leading financial institutions to  
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under-estimate future risks following periods of low volatility or low credit losses. 
A more formal account of over-extrapolation in credit markets might go as follows (see the 
Internet Appendix for a model). Suppose the economy exogenously switches between good times in 
which few firms default, and bad times in which a higher fraction of firms default. However, 
following Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), investors think that the economy either evolves 
according to a more or less persistent process. Following a string of low-default realizations, 
investors start to believe that the process governing defaults is more persistent than it truly is, leading 
them to under-estimate future default probabilities and bid up the price of risky corporate debt. These 
expectations will be revised after a period of high corporate defaults, resulting in a sharp decline in 
bond prices. If these bad times persist for long enough, investors will begin to over-estimate future 
default probabilities. According to this interpretation, credit market “sentiment” is favorable when 
investors are underestimating future default probabilities. These dynamics generate short-term return 
continuation and longer-term return reversals for corporate bonds.
29 
To understand why the quality of corporate debt issuance might contain information about 
future bond returns, consider how firms would behave in this environment. Low quality firms would 
respond by issuing overpriced debt during booms, raising their leverage. Although investors know 
that leverage impacts default probabilities, their growing belief that good times are likely to persist 
leads them to underestimate the impact of rising leverage on default probabilities. Following a string 
of low aggregate defaults, investors become willing to lend to more highly levered firms for a given 
spread. Thus, a lower level of issuer quality is associated with greater over-optimism about future 
default rates and lower expected returns. 
There are two reasons to consider explanations in which investors may occasionally make 
expectational errors of the sort described above. First, such explanations are potentially consistent 
with the finding that expected excess returns may occasionally be negative. Second, although not 
                                                            
29 One could also develop of model of credit market overreaction along the lines of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998).  
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necessarily unique to these theories, an important prediction of the over-extrapolation story is that 
issuer quality should be low following a string of low realized defaults. The results in Table VIII bear 
this out. Specifically, ISS
EDF is high (i.e., issuer quality is low) following periods when default rates 
have been low and high yield excess returns have been high. These patterns are particularly 
pronounced when analyzed in changes: past defaults and returns explain 65% of the 2-year changes 
in ISS
EDF. Furthermore, these results continue to hold even if we control for recent macroeconomic 
conditions or recent stock returns. Thus, Table 9 suggests that the recent experience of credit market 
investors may play a role in shaping their current expectations.
30 
F.  Assessment and implications for the literature on credit cycles 
To summarize, many of our findings are consistent with consumption-based models that 
emphasize countercyclical variation in rationally required returns. However, it is not easy to reconcile 
much of our evidence – e.g., the finding that expected returns are occasionally negative – with the 
predictions of these models. There is some evidence hinting that frictional explanations based on 
limited intermediary capital or agency problems may play a role. Finally, models that emphasize 
over-extrapolation could help make sense of the finding that expected returns may sometimes be 
negative, but otherwise make few uniquely distinguishing predictions.  
Irrespective of how exactly one interprets the evidence of return predictability for corporate 
bonds, our results are consistent with an emerging consensus within the asset pricing literature: the 
bulk of asset price movements, particularly at the asset class level, appears to be driven by time-
variation in expected returns (i.e., “discount rate news”) with time-variation in asset fundamentals 
(i.e., “cash flow news”) playing a smaller role. Furthermore, by linking patterns of corporate debt 
financing to time-series variation in expected bonds returns, our results suggest that time-variation in 
discount rates plays a critical role in driving the credit cycle. 
                                                            
30 Consistent with the idea that the extrapolation of past performance can explain some of the time-variation in issuer 
quality, we obtain similar return forecasting results if we instrument for ISS
EDF using past high yield default rates. 
Specifically, estimating      
       ∙       
             using two-stage least squares yields b = -18.503 (t = -4.93) 
versus an OLS estimate of b = -15.254 (t = -5.29).  
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While this conclusion may seem intuitive and somewhat obvious, it is quite distinct from the 
view emphasized in workhorse models of the credit cycle such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In these models, lenders have 
constant required returns and all of the time variation in the cost of debt financing is due to variation 
in corporate financing frictions – e.g., the deadweight cost of bankruptcy (Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999)), agency problems (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)), or moral hazard (Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997)). Time-variation in these frictions, in turn, is driven by the evolution of borrower net 
worth, bankruptcy costs, or the objective probability of default. Our results indicate that changes in 
investor risk appetite and beliefs also play a central role in driving credit cycles. This suggests that 
accounts based solely on time-varying financing frictions are incomplete. 
V.  Conclusions 
A large literature in corporate finance and macroeconomics identifies reasons why the 
quantity of credit may fluctuate over the business cycle, but makes little attempt to connect the 
fluctuations to investor beliefs or risk aversion. In this paper, we show that there is a strong link. We 
draw on more than 80 years of historical data to construct a measure of issuer quality, and then use 
this measure to forecast excess corporate bond returns. When issuer quality is low, corporate bonds 
subsequently underperform Treasuries.  We uncover a striking degree of predictability and often 
forecast significantly negative excess returns. 
Our results have practical implications for the ongoing debate about whether central banks 
should lean against incipient credit booms. For instance, the Basel Commmitee (2010) has proposed 
varying bank capital buffers over the cycle to protect the banking sector against periods of “excess 
aggregate credit growth.” More recently, Stein (2013) suggests that “one of the most difficult jobs 
that central banks face is in dealing with episodes of credit market overheating.” A major challenge 
for any countercyclical credit policy is identifying the existence of a sentiment driven credit boom in 
the first place. Our results suggest that looking at credit quantities or credit spreads is not enough –  
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policymakers should also consider the credit quality of debt market financing.    
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Figure 1. Issuer Quality. ISS
EDF, is the difference between the average EDF decile between high and low debt issuers. EDF is the 
expected default frequency of Merton (1974). The figure also shows shading for NBER-designated recessions. The dotted line shows a 
version of ISS
EDF that has been orthogonalized with respect to the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott filtered real GDP). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The High Yield Share. HYS is the log fraction of non-financial corporate bond issuance with a high yield rating from 
Moody's. HYS is constructed using data from Hickman (1960) and Atkinson's (1967) NBER studies from 1926-1965, from hand-
collected data from Moody's Bond Survey's from 1966-1982, and from FISD for 1983-2008.  For comparison, the figure plots ISS
EDF 
on the right-scale. 
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Figure 3. Issuer Quality and Subsequent High Yield Excess Returns. Issuer quality (left axis) plotted alongside cumulative excess 
high yield bond returns for the following two years (right axis). Returns are plotted in reverse scale, so the negative correlation appears 
positive visually. Issuer quality is measured with ISS
EDF, the difference between the average EDF decile of high and low debt issuers 
from 1962- 2008.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Quality and Quantity and the Credit Cycle. The figure plots the Flow of Funds (FOF) and Compustat-based measures of 
aggregate non-financial credit growth on the left axis versus our measures of issuer quality, ISS
EDF, on the right-axis 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Mean, median, standard deviation, and extreme values of firm characteristics (Panel A) and time-series variables (Panels B-E). Panel A 
summarizes the firm-level characteristics, with the exact details of their construction given in the Internet Appendix. Net debt issuance is the 
change in assets minus the change in book equity, scaled by by lagged assets. Net equity issuance is the growth of balance sheet equity, net of 
retained earnings, scaled by lagged assets. External finance is the sum of net debt and net equity issuance. EDF is the Merton (1974) expected 
default frequency, calculated following Bharath and Shumway (2008). SHUM is the bankruptcy hazard rate as estimated by Shumway (2001). 
Interest coverage is EBITDA divided by annual interest expense. Leverage is book debt over assets. Age is the number of years on CRSP. 
Dividends is annual cash dividend scaled by assets. For each characteristic X, ISS
X compares the average characteristic decile of high and low 
quintile debt issuers in that year, where quintiles are based on NYSE breakpoints. These time-series are summarized in Panel B. Characteristics 
include EDF, SHUM, interest coverage, leverage, idiosyncratic volatility, size, age, and dividend policy. “High” and “Low” are defined such 
that high is associated with a higher default probabilities. Panel C summarizes the high yield share HYS, which is the dollar fraction of non-
financial debt issues receive a high yield rating, according to Moody’s. From 1983-2008, HYS is based on data from the Fixed Income 
Securities Database (FISD). HYS from 1966-1982 is based on our assembly of bond issues from the Moody’s Bond Surveys, HYS from 1944-
1965 is based on Table B-1 of Atkinson (1967), and HYS from 1926-1943 is based on Table V2 of Hickman (1960). Panel D summarizes bond 
returns and the time-series control variables. yS the log yield on the short-term government bond. yGL - yGS is the spread between the yields on 
the intermediate- and short-term government bonds from Ibbotson, and yBBB - yGL is the BBB credit spread. Growth in industrial production, 
aggregate consumption growth, a recession dummy, the output gap, and Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001) consumption wealth ratio (cay) are 
macroeconomic control variables. Log excess returns on corporate bonds are computed for bond index returns based on high yield (HY), BBB-
rated, and AAA-rated bonds, and are denoted rx. Excess stock returns (MKTRF), HML returns, and SMB are from Ken French. Panel E 
summarizes time-series measures of intermediary balance sheet strength, including bank balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all 
over assets) and bank balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); insurer balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all 
over assets) and insurer balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); broker dealer balance sheet capital (total assets minus 
liabilities all over assets) and balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); lagged equal weighted returns on bank stocks based on 
Fama and French 48-industry classifications; and bank loan loss provisions scaled by total loans and leases from Table CB11 from the FDIC’s 
Historical Statistics on Banking. Bank, Insurer, and Broker Dealer data are from the Flow of Funds accounts. Banks include commercial banks 
(Table L109), saving institutions (L114) and credit unions (L115). Insurance companies include property and casualty (Table L116) and life 
(Table L117). Broker dealers are on Table L129. 
 
Mean Median  SD  Min  Max 
Panel A: Firm-level data (1962-2008, firm-year observations) 
Debt issues: d/A  0.09 0.04 0.40  -4.13  6.50 
Equity issues: e/A  0.24 0.01 1.54  -0.55  48.09 
External Finance: (d+e)/A  0.30 0.09 1.31  -0.75  40.96 
Expected Default Frequency: EDF  0.06 0.00 0.18 0.00  1.00 
Shumway Distress: SHUM  0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00  0.97 
Interest coverage: i/EBITDA  23.72 5.44  223.97  -3976.00  5,779.57 
Leverage: D/A  0.23 0.20 0.19 0.00  0.85 
Market Capitalization: Log(MV)  1,166.39 75.62  8,367.79  0.11  60,2432.90 
Age  13.25 8.42  14.17 0.00  83.00 
Dividends  0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.60 
Panel B: Debt issuer quality (1962-2008, annual time series) 
ISS
EDF Expected Default Frequency (high-low)  0.25 0.31 0.48  -0.88  1.32 
ISS
Shum Shumway distress (high-low)  0.11 0.14 0.32  -0.79  0.78 
ISS
Intcov Interest coverage (low-high)  -0.22 -0.24  0.39 -0.98 0.81 
ISS
Lev Leverage (low-high)  1.23 1.24 0.57  -0.03  2.58 
ISS
σ CAPM σ  (low-high)  -0.35 -0.30  0.54 -1.66 0.89 
ISS
ME  Size (small-large)  -0.60 -0.60  0.29 -1.24 0.04 
ISS
Age Age (young-old)  0.59 0.58 0.24  -0.09  1.06 
ISS
Nonpayer Dividends (nonpayer-payer)  -0.06 -0.05  0.06 -0.20 0.08 
Panel C: The High Yield Share (1926-2008, annual time series)  
HYS (FISD, 1983-2008)  0.32 0.34 0.12 0.05  0.56 
HYS (Moodys manuals & NBER, 1926-1982)  0.11  0.08  0.10  0.00  0.64 
HYS (Spliced series, 1926-2008)  0.18  0.14  0.15  0.00  0.64  
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean Median  SD  Min  Max 
Panel D: Returns and macroeconomic controls % (1962-2008, annual time series) 
Macroeconomic  Controls:        
y
G
S,t  5.61 5.23 3.12 0.03  16.86 
y
G
Lt – y
G
S.t  0.37 0.37 0.84  -1.73  2.28 
y
BBB
t – y
G
Lt   1.69 1.60 0.77 0.50  5.11 
Industrial Production  2.76 3.06 4.38  -9.74  9.52 
Aggregate Consumption Growth  3.36 3.46 1.81  -1.21  6.13 
Recession Dummy  0.29 0.00 0.46 0.00  1.00 
Output Gap (HP filtered log GDP)  0.02 0.08 1.37  -3.68  3.09 
Cay  -0.01 0.01 1.52  -3.52  3.28 
F1 (1964-2007)  -6.21 -21.15 120.66  -198.90  490.20 
F2 (1964-2007)  12.55 23.84  113.24  -361.34  268.16 
F3 (1964-2007)  -12.57 -17.88  91.49  -373.68  250.01 
R e t u r n s :         
rx
HY
t+1 (1-year excess High Yield return)  0.45 1.98  13.10  -42.65  48.31 
rx
BBB
 t+1 (1-year excess BBB return)  0.53 0.64 7.02  -22.42  27.91 
rx
AAA
 t+1 (1-year excess AAA return)  -0.51 0.39 3.40  -8.44  4.22 
rx
HY
t+2 (2-year excess High Yield return)  -0.23 1.42  14.34  -50.37  31.38 
rx
BBB
 t+2 (2-year excess BBB return)  0.42 2.61 7.93  -27.52  20.27 
rx
AAA
 t+2 (2-year excess AAA return)  -1.05 0.59 5.65  -13.59  7.91 
rx
HY
t+3 (3-year excess High Yield return)  -0.13 -0.52 15.80  -42.28  36.42 
rx
BBB
 t+3 (3-year excess BBB return)  0.79 2.22 8.98  -26.35  25.56 
rx
AAA
 t+3 (3-year excess AAA return)  -1.46 0.16 7.33  -20.30  9.98 
MKTRFt+1  3.46 8.93  17.65  -51.59  27.41 
HML t+1  4.65 6.73  12.23  -30.58  32.95 
SMB t+1  2.40 3.69  12.37  -29.02  34.88 
rx
EDF
 t+1  -1.89 8.93  13.14  -32.93  30.12 
Default Rates and Changes in  Spreads:        
DEF
HY
t+1  3.36 2.09 3.10 0.00  12.97 
,, 1()
BBB G
L tk L tk yy
    0.02 -0.05  0.88 -3.41 3.07 
,, 2()
BBB G
Lt k L tk yy
    0.11 0.06 0.95  -1.41  3.87 
,, 3()
BBB G
Lt k L tk yy
    0.15 0.19 1.01  -1.89  3.49 
Panel E: Intermediary Balance Sheets % (1962-2008, annual time series) 
E/ABank  5.83 5.21 2.88 1.70  12.10 
dA/ABank  8.21 8.57 3.68  -1.39  15.26 
E/AInsurer  12.20  12.30 1.35 8.58  14.27 
dA/AInsurer  8.11 8.29 4.09  -8.00  15.46 
E/ABD  6.98 4.93 4.77 0.47  18.14 
dA/ABD  14.02 13.58 19.40  -28.29  74.11 
RBank,t-3,t  30.79 36.29 40.36  -99.42  124.55 
LoanLossesBank  0.75 0.58 0.64 0.12  3.53 
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Table 2 
Measuring Corporate Debt Issuer Quality 
ISS
EDF compares the average EDF decile of high and low quintile debt issuers in that year, where quintiles are based on NYSE breakpoints. 
ISS
EDF takes on high values when firms with higher estimated default probabilities are disproportionately net issuers of debt. The high yield 
share HYS is the dollar fraction of non-financial debt issues receive a high yield rating, according to Moody’s. From 1983-2008, HYS is 
based on data from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). HYS from 1966-1982 is based on our assembly of bond issues from the 
Moody’s Bond Surveys, HYS from 1944-1965 is based on Table B-1 of Atkinson (1967), and HYS from 1926-1943 is based on Table V2 of 
Hickman (1960). 
 
Year  HYS ISS
EDF  Year  HYS ISS
EDF 
1926 0.182   N/A 1968 0.137 1.324 
1927 0.177   N/A 1969 0.141 1.024 
1928 0.270   N/A 1970 0.033 0.094 
1929 0.262   N/A 1971 0.081  -0.274 
1930 0.135   N/A 1972 0.056 0.312 
1931 0.108   N/A 1973 0.038 0.674 
1932 0.229   N/A 1974 0.002 0.213 
1933 0.639   N/A 1975 0.002  -0.661 
1934 0.212   N/A 1976 0.006  -0.573 
1935 0.150   N/A 1977 0.062 0.069 
1936 0.062   N/A 1978 0.128 0.611 
1937 0.129   N/A 1979 0.099 0.103 
1938 0.053   N/A 1980 0.139  -0.259 
1939 0.261   N/A 1981 0.132 0.607 
1940 0.151   N/A 1982 0.146 0.376 
1941 0.045   N/A 1983 0.217 0.389 
1942 0.137   N/A 1984 0.294 0.718 
1943 0.104   N/A 1985 0.353 0.297 
1944 0.026   N/A 1986 0.264 0.356 
1945 0.044   N/A 1987 0.424 0.577 
1946 0.037   N/A 1988 0.561 0.562 
1947 0.007   N/A 1989 0.394 0.206 
1948 0.010   N/A 1990 0.049  -0.280 
1949 0.023   N/A 1991 0.074  -0.885 
1950 0.031   N/A 1992 0.285  -0.189 
1951 0.023   N/A 1993 0.336 0.051 
1952 0.013   N/A 1994 0.389 0.381 
1953 0.011   N/A 1995 0.258 0.172 
1954 0.044   N/A 1996 0.420 0.395 
1955 0.076   N/A 1997 0.496 0.623 
1956 0.107   N/A 1998 0.409 0.981 
1957 0.077   N/A 1999 0.306 0.369 
1958 0.041   N/A 2000 0.180 0.178 
1959 0.146   N/A 2001 0.200  -0.414 
1960 0.079   N/A 2002 0.250  -0.806 
1961 0.056   N/A 2003 0.395  -0.551 
1962 0.030 0.267 2004 0.493 0.267 
1963 0.082 0.276  2005 0.391 0.540 
1964 0.166 0.577  2006 0.375 0.429 
1965 0.210 0.756  2007 0.337 0.420 
1966 0.193 0.929  2008 0.177 0.095 
1967 0.214 0.368       
Average 0.176  0.249 
SD 0.146  0.478 
   
47 
 
Table 3 
Issuer Quality and the Returns to Corporate Credit 
Univariate time-series forecasting regressions of log excess returns on issuance quality ISS
EDF and log(HYS): 
tk t tk rx a b X u      
ISS
EDF is the difference between the expected default frequency deciles of high and low net debt issuers in each year. The high yield 
(HYS) is the fraction of non-financial corporate bond issuance with a high yield rating from Moody’s. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is the cumulative 1-, 2-, or 3-year excess return on high yield bonds. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 
2-, or 3-year excess return on BBB-rated corporate bonds. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 2-, or 3-year 
excess return on AAA-rated corporate bonds. t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
  Xt = ISS
EDF   Xt = log(HYS ) 
  Full sample (1962-2008)  1983+  Full sample (1926-2008)  1983+ 
  1-yr:  2-yr:  3-yr:  1-yr:  2-yr:  3-yr:  1-yr:  2-yr:  3-yr:  1-yr:  2-yr:  3-yr: 
Panel A: High Yield Excess Returns (rx
HY) 
b  -9.534 -15.254 -17.301  -11.132  -21.021 -27.966 -1.517 -2.917 -3.884 -11.483 -14.264 -17.798
[t]  [-3.97]  [-5.29]  [-3.68] [-2.64] [-5.20] [-6.19]  [-1.77] [-1.98] [-1.93]  [-2.77] [-4.23] [-5.76] 
R
2  0.12  0.26  0.29 0.10 0.32 0.48  0.02  0.04  0.05 0.15 0.21 0.28 
Panel B: BBB Excess Returns (rx
BBB) 
b  -5.311  -6.945  -6.645 -3.576 -6.092 -8.022  -0.874  -1.656  -2.100 -3.139 -3.344 -5.118 
[t]  [-3.96]  [-4.87]  [-3.00] [-1.87] [-3.01] [-3.26]  [-1.71] [-1.86] [-1.85]  [-1.32] [-2.46] [-2.09] 
R
2  0.13  0.18  0.13 0.04 0.15 0.23  0.02  0.04  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 
Panel C: AAA Excess Returns (rx
AAA) 
b  -2.278  -3.321  -3.372 -0.799 -2.184 -3.578  -0.310  -0.473  -0.108 -0.030 -1.015 -1.920 
[t]  [-2.43]  [-2.55]  [-1.50] [-0.95] [-1.38] [-2.03]  [-1.17] [-1.03] [-0.19]  [-0.07] [-1.07] [-1.14] 
R
2  0.10  0.08  0.05 0.02 0.07 0.13  0.02  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 
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Table 4 
Multivariate Forecasting Regressions 
Time-series forecasting regressions of log excess returns on speculative-grade bonds on measures of debt issuance quality, 
controlling for the term spread, short-rate, credit spread, and lagged excess returns: 
() ( )
HY G G G BBB G HY
tk t L t S t S t L t L t t tk rx a b X c y y d y e y y f rx u             
In Panel A, Xt is ISS
EDF from 1962-2008; in Panel B, Xt is ISS
EDF from 1983-2008; in Panel C, Xt is log(HYS) from 1926-2008; in 
Panel D, Xt is log(HYS) from 1983-2008. t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) standard 
errors allowing for serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
  1-yr returns  2-yr returns  3-yr returns  
Panel A: Xt = ISS
EDF (1962-2008) 
ISS
EDF  -7.636 -8.617 -6.282  -11.022  -18.052 -13.890 -14.214 -21.697 -19.343 
[-3.45] [-2.97] [-2.40] [-3.45] [-4.60] [-4.54] [-2.57] [-3.83] [-3.77] 
,,
GG
L tS t y y    1.495 2.031 5.025 8.055 4.61 9.477
[0.62]   [0.67] [2.25]   [3.36] [2.49]   [5.68] 
,
G
St y   -0.442 -0.49 0.487 0.845 1.152 2.102
[-0.62]    [-0.68] [1.02]   [1.40] [1.86]   [3.06] 
,,
BBB G
L tL t y y    3.836 3.773 -1.498 -5.05 -3.595 -10.624
 [1.29] [1.21]    [-0.52]  [-1.59]   [0.86]  [-2.44] 
HY
t rx   -0.264 -0.29 -0.498 -0.729 -0.667 -0.936
  [-1.77]  [-1.62] [-2.35] [-3.46]   [3.45] [-5.20]
R
2  0.15 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.45 0.33 0.39 0.51 
Panel B: Xt = ISS
EDF (1983-2008)
ISS
EDF  -6.120 -7.609 -4.492  -15.578  -24.240 -15.865 -31.055 -35.796 -35.669 
[-1.07] [-1.50] [-0.85] [-2.67] [-5.33] [-2.49] [-4.60] [-5.78] [-7.09] 
,,
GG
LtS t y y    2.537 4.478 6.687 10.175 3.773 7.136
[0.52]   [0.89] [1.57]   [2.16] [1.41]   [3.08] 
,
G
St y   -1.036 0.392 0.608 0.262 2.874 2.566
[-0.60]   [0.27] [0.67]   [0.26] [3.02]   [2.90] 
,,
BBB G
L tL t y y    9.948 9.214 -4.242 -6.044 -15.979 -17.903
  [2.00]  [1.88]   [-0.48] [-0.70]   [-1.83] [-2.11] 
HY
t rx   -0.020 -0.114 -0.536 -0.773 -0.823 -0.899
 [-0.08] [-0.45]   [-2.29] [-3.07]   [-4.80] [-7.66] 
R
2  0.13 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.70 
Panel C: Xt = log(HYS) (1926-2008) 
log(HYS)  -1.495 -1.925 -1.717 -3.154 -3.438 -3.250 -4.067 -4.543 -4.254 
[-1.88] [-2.32] [-2.14] [-2.51] [-2.57] [-2.63] [-2.21] [-2.23] [-2.20] 
,,
GG
LtS t y y    2.201 0.275 6.269 5.577 5.555 3.076
[1.20]   [0.12] [2.47]   [1.46] [1.31]   [0.51] 
,
G
St y   -0.375 -0.514 -0.054 -0.057 -0.240 -0.515
[-0.78]   [-0.94] [-0.07]   [-0.06] [-0.20]   [-0.38] 
,,
BBB G
L tL t y y    3.492 2.936 4.552 1.024 5.904 3.658
 [1.53] [1.13]   [1.60] [0.28]   [1.78] [0.76] 
HY
t rx   0.172 0.131 0.307 0.130 0.201 0.067
  [1.06]  [0.80] [1.27] [0.49]   [0.73] [0.21]
R
2  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.12 
Panel D: Xt = log(HYS) (1983-2008) 
log(HYS)  -11.180 -6.632 -5.326  -11.889  -12.432  -9.525 -15.000 -17.516 -14.451 
[-2.89] [-1.58] [-1.20] [-3.21] [-3.12] [-2.32] [-5.05] [-4.02] [-5.19] 
,,
GG
LtS t y y    1.803 4.203 8.188 11.651 8.269 11.254
[0.39]   [0.81] [2.10]   [2.55] [2.34]   [3.52] 
,
G
St y   -1.751 -0.225 -1.052 -1.173 -0.105 -0.430
[-1.19]   [-0.15] [-1.14]   [-1.11] [-0.08]   [-0.34] 
,,
BBB G
L tL t y y    11.227 8.335 5.693 -4.489 -0.161 -9.068
 [2.42] [1.56]   [0.53]  [-0.57]    [-0.01]  [-0.85] 
HY
t rx   0.138 -0.059 -0.025 -0.620 -0.077 -0.585
  [0.56] [-0.27]   [-0.08] [-2.20]   [-0.22] [-2.79] 
R
2  0.24 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.22 0.48 0.39 0.28 0.45  
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Table 5 
Quantity and Quality and Future Returns to Credit 
Annual time-series regressions of the form      
       ∙      ∙      
       
    ∙    
    ∙      
         
     ∙     
         , where rx
HY is the cumulative 2-year excess return on 
high yield bonds, DAgg/DAgg is the annual percentage change in total debt for nonfinancial Compustat firms, Dk/Dk denotes aggregate debt growth in NYSE EDF deciles k. Panel A 
shows regressions without controls. Panel B shows regressions with controls: the term spread, short-rate, credit spread, lagged excess high yield returns. t-statistics are based on 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to 2-lags. 
 
  Panel A: Univariate 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Issuer Quality  ISS
EDF  -15.254 -12.978  
[-5.29]   [-3.78]         
Agg. debt growth  DAgg/DAgg  -5.212 -2.433  
  [-3.97]  [-1.49]         
Low EDF  D1/D1  -3.474  -1.565 -4.917
    [-2.04]      [-0.86]   [-3.16] 
2  D2/D2  -3.806  
     [ - 2 . 9 7 ]        
3  D3/D3  -2.842 
      [ - 2 . 3 1 ]       
4  D4/D4   -4.025
       [ - 1 . 9 2 ]      
High EDF  D5/D5   -7.091 -6.631
        [-3.76]  [-3.09]   
High-Low  D5/D5 - D1/D1   -5.420 -6.538
          [-2.39]  [-3.09] 
  R
2  0.26 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.26 
Panel B: Including additional time-series controls 
Issuer Quality  ISS
EDF  -13.890 -11.442  
[-4.54]   [-3.73]         
Agg. debt growth  DAgg/DAgg  -6.497 -5.126  
  [-3.22]  [-2.40]         
Low EDF  D1/D1  -3.329  -2.357 -5.808
    [-1.77]      [-1.23]   [-2.49] 
2  D2/D2  -2.367  
     [ - 1 . 1 7 ]        
3  D3/D3  -3.104 
      [ - 1 . 9 6 ]       
4  D4/D4   -4.629
       [ - 2 . 6 8 ]      
High EDF  D5/D5   -7.053 -6.827
        [-3.21]  [-3.04]   
High-Low  D5/D5 - D1/D1   -5.429 -6.731
          [-2.60]  [-3.04] 
  R
2  0.45 0.43 0.51 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.52  
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Table 6 
Robustness 
Robustness checks on the time-series forecasting regression from Tables 2 and 3 
2 2 () ( )
HY EDF G G G BBB G HY
t t Lt St St Lt Lt t t rx a b ISS c y y d y e y y f rx u           
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year cumulative excess log return on high yield bonds. The table reports the coefficient and t-statistic on the 
main variable of interest, ISS
EDF, as well as the regression R
2. The multivariate specifications include controls for the term spread, short-rate, 
credit spread, and lagged excess high yield returns. We adjustment the baseline regression in row (1) in a number of ways. Rows (2)-(5) 
present subsample results. In rows (6)-(11) we consider additional controls, including the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott filtered real GDP) in 
(6); other macroeconomic controls (industrial production, consumption growth, and a recession dummy) in (7); leads and lags of those macro 
controls in (8); the 8 macro factors from Ludvigson and Ng (2010) in (9); cay from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) in (10); and the Cochrane-
Piazzesi (2005) tent factor in (11). Rows (12)-(17) consider alternate constructions of ISS
EDF. Rows (18)-(24) consider alternate quality-
related firm characteristics, including the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy hazard, interest coverage, leverage, idiosyncratic volatility, market 
capitalization, age, and payout policy. Finally, rows (25) and (26) control for ontemporaneous equity market returns in (25); and for 
contemporaneous realizations of the Fama and French (1993) factors in (26). t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
allowing for serial correlation up to 2 lags. 
 
    Univariate  With time-series controls 
    b  [t]  R
2 b  [t]  R
2 
(1)  Baseline Result  -15.254 [-5.29] 0.26  -13.890 [-4.54] 0.45 
  Subsamples:           
(2)  Longer 1952-2008 sample  -9.403  [-3.03] 0.16  -8.367 [-3.00] 0.38 
(3)  Pre-1983  -8.994 [-3.90] 0.23  -9.383 [-2.48] 0.40 
(4)  1983-Present  -21.021 [-5.20] 0.32  -15.865 [-2.49] 0.51 
(5)  Dropping  2008-2009  -14.556 [-5.32] 0.33  -13.997 [-4.33] 0.47 
 Additional  Controls:           
(6) Output  Gap  -13.592  [-4.05] 0.27  -13.548 [-4.32] 0.46 
(7)  Other Macro Variables  -12.975  [-2.97] 0.30  -10.045 [-3.08] 0.50 
(8)  Leads/Lags of Macro Variables  -11.834 [-2.67] 0.46  -11.639 [-2.36] 0.59 
(9)  Eight macro factors  -12.303  [-4.29] 0.48  -13.659 [-4.13] 0.56 
(10)  Cay  -12.910 [-3.99] 0.41  -11.550 [-3.11] 0.49 
(11)  Cochrane-Piazzessi Tent Factor  -14.499 [-4.87] 0.30  -13.818 [-3.66] 0.45 
(12)  Aggregate Corporate Leverage  -15.252 [-5.21] 0.26  -14.006 [-4.25] 0.46 
  Alternate Constructions of ISS
EDF:           
(13) Debt  Iss,  EDF  Level  -372.414 [-5.37] 0.26 -274.561 [-6.72] 0.44 
(14) Long-term  Debt  Iss,  EDF Decile   -18.663  [-4.28]  0.24  -15.087 [-4.21] 0.44 
(15) Short-term  Debt  Iss,  EDF  Decile  -3.531 [-0.86] 0.02  -3.668 [-0.98] 0.33 
(16) Asset  Weighted  -5.890 [-3.83] 0.21  -3.700 [-2.70] 0.38 
(17)  Debt Iss Weighted  -4.970 [-3.44] 0.16  -3.597 [-3.20] 0.39 
(18) Nonfinancials  Only  -15.178 [-4.02] 0.21  -13.234 [-3.64] 0.42 
  Alternate Measures of Credit Quality:           
(19)  Shumway Distress   -18.751  [-3.60] 0.18  -15.560 [-3.31] 0.40 
(20)  Interest coverage (Low – High)  -15.318 [-3.41] 0.16  -12.077 [-2.51] 0.39 
(21) Leverage  (Debt/Assets)  -7.804 [-2.42] 0.10  -4.711 [-1.30] 0.34 
(22)  CAPM  -8.696 [-3.25] 0.11  -4.310 [-0.91] 0.33 
(23)  Size (Small – Big)  -10.967  [-1.71] 0.05  -3.222 [-0.50] 0.32 
(24) Age  (Young  –  Old)  -15.141 [-2.38] 0.07  -16.263 [-2.18] 0.37 
(25)  Dividends (Non-payer – Payer)  -83.443 [-2.84] 0.12  -69.163 [-2.15] 0.37 
 Link  to  Equity  Market:           
(26)  Contemporaneous Equity Returns (MKTRF)  -13.409 [-5.32] 0.64  -12.232 [-3.80] 0.72 
(27) Contemporaneous  Fama-French  Factors  -11.011 [-4.88] 0.69  -12.603 [-4.79] 0.76 
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Table 7 
Forecasting Changes in Credit Spreads and Defaults 
Annual time-series forecasting regressions of changes in BBB-rated credit spreads: 
,, () ( )( ) .
BBB G EDF G G G BBB G HY HY
L t k L t k t Lt St St Lt Lt t t t k k yy a b I S S c y y d y e y y f r x g D E F u                  
 
1 2 () ( ) ,
HY EDF HY G G G BBB G HY
t k t t Lt St St Lt Lt t t k DEF a b ISS b DEF c y y d y e y y f rx u               
where Δk denotes the k-year difference,       
   denotes the issuer-weighted default rate for high yield bonds in year      from the annual Moody’s default survey, y
BBB-y
G is the credit 
spread, and ISS
EDF is the difference between the expected default frequency decile of high and low net debt issuers in each year. Control variables include the term spread, short-rate, 
credit spread, lagged excess high yield returns, and the time-t default rate. t-statistics for k-period forecasting regressions are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for 
serial correlation up to k-lags. 
 
  Change in Credit Spreads  Defaults in Year:
  1-year change 
,1 ,1 1()
BBB G
Lt Lt yy
  
2-year change 
,2 ,2 2()
BBB G
Lt Lt yy
   
3-year change 
,3 ,3 3()
BBB G
Lt Lt yy
   
t+1  t+2  t+3 
             
EDF ISS   0.609 0.352 0.237 0.925 0.449 0.419 0.879 0.519 0.296 1.502 1.352 2.990 3.322 2.488 3.269 
[4.07] [2.26] [1.45] [5.33] [1.85] [2.14] [6.25] [1.81] [1.05] [2.48] [2.39] [3.53] [4.62] [1.78] [1.91] 
,,
GG
Lt St yy     -0.244 -0.280   -0.582 -0.631   -0.562  -0.427   0.281   -0.827   -1.063 
 [-1.39] [-1.75]   [-2.59] [-2.23]   [-2.36]  [-1.91]   [0.41]   [-1.20]   [-1.25] 
,
G
St y    0.024 0.042    -0.070 0.004    -0.156  -0.066   0.005   -0.084   -0.033 
 [0.43] [0.86]    [-1.62] [0.09]    [-3.46]  [-0.98]   [0.03]   [-0.34]   [-0.22] 
,,
BBB G
Lt Lt yy        -0.523    -0.668    -0.663   0.824   1.401   1.501 
   [-3.32]    [-2.78]    [-1.76]   [1.39]   [1.23]   [1.53] 
HY
t rx       0.010    0.025    0.020   -0.084   0.048   0.128 
   [1.53]    [1.34]    [-1.50]   [-2.05]   [1.12]   [2.01] 
HY DEF  
   0.052    0.093    -0.013  0.786 0.618 0.614 0.681 0.359 0.538 
   [1.50]    [2.17]    [-0.27]  [4.08] [2.31] [3.53] [2.90] [2.04] [2.47] 
R
2  0.11 0.17 0.45 0.22 0.36 0.60 0.18 0.36 0.55 0.37 0.56 0.25 0.30 0.13 0.22 
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Table 8 
Intermediary Balance Sheets and Issuer Quality 
This table explores the relationship between ISS
EDF and measures of intermediary balance sheet strength Z. The first two columns in 
each panel report the coefficient on Zt from regressions of the form 
() ( ) .
tk
EDF G G G BBB G HY
t t Lt St St Lt Lt t ab Z u ISS c y y d y e y y f rx
              
Columns (3) to (6) report the coefficients on ISS
EDF
 and Zt from return forecasting regressions of the form 
2 2 () ( ) ,
HY
t t
EDF G G G BBB G HY
t t Lt St St Lt Lt t rx a b ISS b Z u cy y d y ey y f r x
              
 
where rx
HY denotes the 2-year excess return on high yield bonds. The regressions alternately omit ISS
EDF, and include the term 
spread, short-rate, credit spread, and lagged excess high yield returns as controls. Measures of intermediary balance sheet strength, 
summarized in Table 1, include insurer equity capital E/A (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and balance sheet growth dA/A 
(year-over-year percentage change in total assets); broker dealer equity capital E/A and balance sheet growth dA/A; bank equity 
capital E/A and balance sheet growth dA/A; lagged equal weighted returns on bank stocks based on Fama and French 48-industry 
classifications; and bank loan loss provisions scaled by total loans and leases. t-statistics for 2-year forecasting regressions are based 
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to 2 lags. 
 
  
Depvar: ISS
EDF  Depvar:  2
HY
t rx   
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Insurer Balance Sheets  ISS
EDF -13.102  -14.251
        [-3.41]    [-3.69] 
  E/AInsurer  0.156 0.133 -4.104 -2.058 -1.336  0.563 
   [3.58] [2.54] [-3.78] [-1.68] [-0.76]  [0.33] 
  dA/AInsurer  -0.008  -0.005 -0.382 -0.493  0.382  0.314 
   [-0.35] [-0.21]  [-0.89]  [-1.06]  [0.70]  [0.53] 
  Controls  No  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
  R
2  0.21  0.48 0.15 0.30 0.33 0.45 
Broker-Dealer Balance Sheets  ISS
EDF -16.006  -14.579
        [-5.25]    [-4.20] 
  E/ABD  -0.017  -0.018  0.160 -0.105 -0.025 -0.289 
    [-0.98] [0.86]  [0.31] [-0.27] [-0.04] [-0.55] 
  dA/ABD  -0.005  -0.003 -0.008 -0.088 -0.035 -0.080 
    [-1.60]  [-1.06] [-0.08] [-0.96] [-0.49] [-1.58] 
  Controls  No  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
  R
2  0.06  0.42 0.00 0.28 0.32 0.46 
Bank Balance Sheets  ISS
EDF -14.032  -13.648
        [-4.28]    [-4.81] 
  E/ABank  -0.013  -0.032 -0.558 -0.734 -0.208 -0.642 
   [-0.40] [-0.96]  [0.50]  [0.88]  [-0.15]  [-0.51] 
  dA/ABank  0.036 0.019 -1.285 -0.780 -0.768 -0.512 
   [1.48] [0.71] [-2.64] [-1.60] [-1.58] [-1.04] 
  Controls  No  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
  R
2  0.07  0.43 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.47 
Lagged Bank Stock Returns  ISS
EDF       -13.927   -13.165 
        [-4.19]    [-3.73] 
  RBank,t-3,t  0.005 0.004 -0.105 -0.039 -0.068 -0.018 
   [2.54] [3.36] [-3.60] [-1.18] [-2.40] [-0.50] 
  Controls  No  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
  R
2  0.16  0.50 0.09 0.27 0.35 0.45 
Bank Loan Loss Provisions  ISS
EDF       -13.594   -13.913 
        [-4.30]    [-4.42] 
  LoanLosses  -0.397  -0.139  10.182 4.783 1.777  -0.161 
    [-1.72]  [-0.59] [2.00] [1.34] [0.36]  [-0.05] 
  Controls  No  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
 R
2  0.14  0.41 0.10 0.28 0.32 0.45 
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Table 9 
Determinants of Issuer Quality 
Time-series regressions of issuer quality ISS
EDF on levels and past changes of interest rates: 
1 ()
EDF G G G HY HY
tS t L t S t t t t ISS a b y c y y d rx e DEF u        , or  11 () .
GG G H Y H Y
kk S t k L t S t t k t k t k t
EDF
t rx ISS a b y c y y d e DEF u               
 
yS
G denotes the short-term Treasury bill yield; yL
G-yS
G denotes the term spread, DEF
HY is the issuer-weighted high yield default rate from Moody’s, rL
HY-rL
G is the excess high yield return, and Δk 
denotes the k-year difference. In columns (1) to (5) we regress the level of ISS
EDF on a number of covariates, columns (6) to (10) repeat this analysis in first differences, and columns (11) to (15) 
in second differences. In the last two columns in each block we add additional controls for lagged stock market returns and macroeconomic variables (the growth in industrial product, real 
consumption growth, and a recession indicator). Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
 
   ISS
EDF  1ISS
EDF  2ISS
EDF 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
Levels: 
,
G
St y   -0.047   -0.036  -0.035  -0.026           
  [-1.63]   [-1.22]  [-1.14]  [-0.99]           
  ()
GG
LtS t yy    -0.277   -0.233  -0.218  -0.204           
  [-4.91]   [-3.41]  [-2.98]  [-2.61]           
 
1
HY
t rx      0.014  0.015  0.009  0.016           
   [1.57] [2.78] [1.42] [3.14]            
 
t DEF     -0.076  -0.013  -0.017  -0.010           
    [-3.11]  [-0.59]  [-0.68]  [-0.40]           
1-year 
, 1
G
St y          -0.107   -0.072  -0.073  -0.078      
Changes:        [-2.41]   [-1.65] [-2.04] [-2.58]       
 
1()
GG
LtS t yy           -0.335   -0.173  -0.165  -0.137      
        [-5.99]   [-2.74] [-2.71] [-2.05]       
 
1
HY
t rx           0.031  0.025  0.014  0.018      
        [6.60] [5.00] [2.24] [3.25]       
 
1 t DEF           -0.043  -0.025  -0.031  -0.020      
         [-1.74]  [-1.11]  [-1.36]  [-1.11]      
2-year 
2
G
St y               -0.134   -0.062  -0.061  -0.084 
Changes:             [-3.31]   [-1.94] [-1.70] [-1.92] 
 
2()
GG
LtS t yy                -0.410   -0.164 -0.154 -0.168 
             [-7.63]   [-2.52] [-2.11] [-1.53] 
 
31
HY
tt rx               0.036 0.027 0.019 0.018 
             [6.91] [4.47] [2.17] [2.65] 
 
2 t DEF                -0.065 -0.049 -0.064 -0.083 
              [-3.77]  [-2.72]  [-2.78]  [-2.45] 
  Other  controls  None None None  Lagged
MKT 
Macro
Vars 
None None None  Lagged
MKT 
Macro
Vars 
None None None Lagged
MKT 
Macro
Vars 
  R
2  0.44 0.34 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.74 0.47 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.75 
 